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By Hook or by Crook: Exploring the 
Legality of an INS Sting Operation 
LENN! B. BENSON* 
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS} is an agency 
with responsibility both for enforcing the immigration laws and 
conferring legal status and other benefits. At times these dual 
roles create conflict, mistrust in the community, and violations of 
the rights of aliens. This article critically examines an undercover 
operation conducted by the San Diego District Office which lured 
aliens to deportation by agency offers of legal status. The article 
discusses the regulatory and statutory provisions governing INS 
undercover operations and the rights of aliens subject to final or-
ders of deportation. It continues with an analysis of the due pro-
cess violations posed by undercover operations. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STING 
In July of 1993, 600 aliens received identical letters on official sta-
tionery of the INS, promising them amnesty in the United States 
and employment authorization cards.1 These generous letters were 
sent by James B. Turnage, Jr., District Director of the INS in San 
Diego. The aliens only had to go to the INS District Office at a set 
* Lenni B. Benson, formerly a partner in the international law firm of Bryan Cave, 
practiced immigration law from 1983 to 1994. In the fall of 1994 she joined the faculty 
of The New York Law School as an Associate Professor. 
The author would like to thank the following people for their suggestions and com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article: Dan Kesselbrenner, Hiroshi Motomura, Michael 
Olivas, Michael Scaperlanda, Peter Schuck, Helen Sklar, Kevin Johnson, and Margaret 
Taylor. 
1. See H.G. Reza, Immigrants Deported in INS Sting Operation, L.A. TIMES, July 
31, 1993, at Al; see also Would-Be Immigrants Stung in INS Operation, 10 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1064 (1993). 
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time and date in order to receive the stated benefits. Mr. Turnage 
cited a "new provision in the amnesty program of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1993," which allowed this "one-time" offer 
of amnesty.2 But the letter was a ruse. There was no 1993 Immigra-
tion Act and there was no law creating an amnesty program. 
The purpose of the letter was to entice the aliens into the INS 
office so they could be deported. 3 In other words, the INS was con-
ducting an undercover or "sting" operation. The spokesperson for the 
INS District Office justified the sting on the ground that the INS 
lacked the resources to "knock on 600 doors."4 As it carried out the 
scheme, the INS deliberately failed to send the "sting" letters to the 
lawyers who represented the aliens.5 Similarly, the INS chose not to 
notify attorneys at the time of the aliens' apprehension. 
INS undercover operations usually target criminal activities such 
as buying and selling illegal documents,6 offering bribes to INS offi-
cials,7 or smuggling aliens into the United States.8 Individuals appre-
hended in those sting operations face criminal prosecution and 
2. The letter reads as follows: 
Dear : 
You may be eligible for employment authorization, for a period of one year, 
under a new provision in the amnesty program of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1993. 
In order for you to receive your employment authorization card you need only 
to report to Room B247 in the parking level of the Federal Building at 880 
Front Street between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, July 20, 1993. 
Bring this letter and some other identification with you. 
Since this is a one-time event, failure to report to this office at this time will 
render you ineligible to receive your employment authorization under this sec-
tion of the amnesty program. 
Signed: James B. Turnage, Jr., District Director 
Letter from James B. Turnage, Jr., District Director, San Diego INS (July 14, 1993) (on 
file with author). 
3. An INS spokesperson told the press that all of the aliens who received this letter 
had outstanding final orders of deportation. Reza, supra note 1, at A23. Some of the 
apprehended aliens disputed that they were under final orders of deportation. In fact, the 
INS admitted that two of the people apprehended in the sting were later released be-
cause they had actually become lawful permanent residents. Id. 
4. Ed Jahn, INS Insists its Work-Permit Sting Legal, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Aug. 1, 1993, at B2 (quoting Rudy Murillo, spokesperson for the San Diego District 
Office). 
5. Bob Mandgie, Assistant Director for Detention and Deportation in the San Di-
ego District Office, said copies of the letter were not mailed to attorneys because "they 
feared that the lawyers would alert their clients to the sting." Reza, supra note 1, at 
A23. 
6. United States v. An Chyi Liu, 960 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1992) (aliens were not 
entrapped in scheme to purchase "green cards"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 418 (1992). 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Ahluwalia, 807 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 
(aliens convicted of bribing an INS officer for work authorization documents), aff d, 30 
F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1994). 
8. United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1990) (smuggler enticed by 
undercover INS agent's offer of payment for illegal transportation of aliens). 
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correspondingly receive the due process protections afforded to crim-
inal defendants. However, the single goal of the San Diego INS 
sting appears to have been the execution of outstanding deportation 
orders.9 In other words, the sting was being used to enforce an order 
in a civil proceeding.10 
Using a sting operation to execute an order of deportation is a 
marked departure from standard INS deportation procedures. Nor-
mally, the INS will send an alien who has a final order of deporta-
tion11 outstanding a "Notice to Appear for Deportation."12 This 
9. There are few reported instances of the INS using a sting operation to appre-
hend aliens. The San Diego District used a similar ruse in 1990 when it sent letters to 
more than 1,400 people, inviting the aliens to renew work authorization papers. Chet 
Barfield, INS Snares 140 in a "Papers Trap," SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 18, 1990, 
at B-1. One-hundred and forty aliens were apprehended in this operation. In EI Paso, 
Texas, INS agents masqueraded as a car dealership using the name "Argim Motors" 
when they sent letters to aliens telling them they had won a Ford Bronco and that they 
needed to show up to collect it. Id. at B-2. "Argim" is "Migra" spelled backwards. "La 
Migra" is a slang term used to describe the INS. 
10. Courts have repeatedly characterized deportation and exclusion proceedings as 
civil, not criminal, proceedings. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 
{1952) (ex post facto clause inapplicable); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 
1986) (bill of attainder clause inapplicable), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 (1986). Accord-
ingly, an alien has fewer rights in immigration hearings. 
The San Diego sting was not being used to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. 
In fact, only a limited class of aliens are subject to a criminal penalty for failure to 
report for deportation, and prosecution is rare for those aliens subject to these penalties. 
Section 242(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) 
(1988), makes failure to report after a final order of deportation has been entered a 
felony offense only for aliens who were found deportable under INA § 24l(a){2), 8 
U.S.C. § 1251{a)(2) (1988) (criminal offenses); INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(3) (1988) (failure to register and falsification of documents); or INA 
§ 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988) (security and related grounds). The prosecu-
tion must establish that the failure to report was willful and occurred after a final order 
of deportation was entered or after completion of judicial review. 
In the criminal law setting, similar types of stings have been used by federal and state 
governments to apprehend individuals who have failed to appear in response to a criminal 
summons, or who have failed to appear after being released on bail. In 1985,-the federal 
government lured fugitives by offering free tickets to a Redskins football game. In the 
spring of 1994, the Ohio State Attorney General's office, in cooperation with the 
Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department, sent letters offering tax refunds, class action 
settlement refunds, or other government benefits, to individuals with outstanding arrest 
warrants. See Laura Mansnerus, Trap is Baited for Fugitives, and They Come Running, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1994, at A22. Although the Ohio sting, which relied on the individ-
uals' trust in the government's promises of benefits, might have raised due process con-
cerns as well, in criminal proceedings the apprehended individual has many greater due 
process protections that serve to mitigate some of the harm of the sting used to appre-
hend the individual. The harm to an alien subject to immediate deportation is described 
more fully in Section II. 
11. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(a) (1993) provides that a deportation order is final and sub-
ject to execution on the date of any of the following events: 
(1) A grant of voluntary departure expires; 
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notice tells the alien to report and provides a minimum of seventy-
two hours of advance notice. Once an alien has been physically re-
moved from the United States, the alien loses the right to pursue 
administrative and judicial review of the action.13 
The San Diego sting did not seek to induce aliens to commit a 
crime (such as bribing an official or procuring false documents), but 
instead appealed to the aliens' understandable desire to obtain legal 
residence in the United States and the aliens' beliefs that the INS 
could help them to achieve this elusive goal. The INS is a hybrid 
agency, with power both to grant benefits and to enforce immigra-
tion laws. The INS "sting" thus exploited any trust the aliens might 
have had in the agency.14 
(2) An immigration judge enters an order of deportation without granting vol-
untary departure or other relief, and the alien respondent waives his or her 
right to appeal; 
(3) The Board of Immigration Appeals enters an order of deportation on ap-
peal, without granting voluntary departure or other relief; or 
( 4) A federal district or appellate court affirms an administrative order of de-
portation in a petition for review or habeas corpus action. 
12. This Notice, Form I-166, is commonly referred to as the "Bag and Baggage" 
Jetter. It instructs the alien to appear, with luggage, at the local INS office for removal 
from the United States. It is not uncommon for the Notice to provide several weeks of 
advance notice. Until 1986, regulations required that this Notice be sent in every case 
before the INS executed an order of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1985) (amended 
1986). Although the regulations no longer mandate the mailing of the Notice, in most 
INS District Offices it is still the standard practice. 3 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY 
MAILMAN. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 72.08[2](b] (rev. ed. 1993). The INS 
often requires that the alien post a bond to ensure appearance at all proceedings. 8 
C.F.R. § 103.6(c)(3), (e) (1993). The INS can prove that the alien breached the condi-
tions of the bond if the INS sent the alien a Bag and Baggage Letter and the alien failed 
to appear. This may explain the continued INS use of Form I-166, the Bag and Baggage 
Letter. Additionally, since the Immigration Act of 1990 created new consequences for 
the alien's failure to appear, the use of the Bag and Baggage letter aids the INS in 
enforcing these consequences by helping to prove the alien had notice of the duty to 
appear. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 242B(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e) (Supp. V 1993) 
(precluding voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of status, and registry for 
failure to appear). Failure to report also can be used as the act that "breaches" any bond 
which might have been posted and thus may explain continued INS use of the form. The 
1990 amendments to the INA made failure to report a factor that can foreclose relief 
from deportation. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 242B(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e) (Supp. 
V 1993) (precluding voluntary departure, adjustment of status, change of status, and 
registry). 
13. This principle is discussed further in Section II.B of this article. There are 
limited, judicially created exceptions to this absolute rule. A sting used to effectuate 
deportation is particularly troubling because the alien might lose all forums in which to 
challenge the government's action and the underlying order of deportation. 
14. Although any reference to Nazi tactics may seem excessive, there are reported 
instances of the use of offers of work permits to Jure Jews to deportation during World 
War II. See Lucy S. DAwmow1cz. THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 299, 
305-06 (1975). "In late November 1942, the Germans declared that the Umschlagplatz 
[a ghetto] had been liquidated and offered amnesty to the 'illegals,' holding out the offer 
of food and employment as bait." Id. at 333. 
In the United States, there is a long history of distrust of INS promises. In her mem-
oir, The Woman Warrior, Maxine Hong Kingston reports that Chinese immigrants 
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As a hybrid agency, the INS has responsibility to serve both citi-
zens and aliens in adjudicating the petitions of those who seek legal 
status and in enforcing deportation and exclusion laws. The San Di-
ego sting ·operation highlights the long-standing tension between the 
INS' roles in service and enforcement, and the difficulty the agency 
has had in separating the two. A classic example of this tension is 
found in the very title of recent major legislation - The Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986.15 The Reform and Control 
Act created sanctions against employers who knowingly hired un-
documented persons, but also granted amnesty to aliens who had 
lived without legal status and had entered the country before 1982 or 
worked within a certain class of agricultural laborers. Congress rec-
ognized the immigrants' long history of distrust of the INS and cre-
ated special legalization offices and confidentiality provisions to 
encourage aliens to apply for the legalization benefits. The INS also 
worked with community groups to administer the legalization pro-
gram, using those groups as centers that prepared and received ap-
plications.16 The San Diego sting undermined years of INS work 
toward establishing credibility for its legalization program when it 
created a "false amnesty" offer as a tool for deportation. Ultimately, 
the use of deceit will erode the agency's ability to accomplish either 
of its missions, service and enforcement, for both require a measure 
of community trust and voluntary compliance. 
In an effort to restore community trust after the sting, the Acting 
Commissioner of the INS, Chris Sale, issued a field memorandum 
instructing all INS offices that sting operations would no longer be 
feared betrayal by the INS: 
Occasionally the rumor went about that the United States immigration author-
ities had set up headquarters in the San Francisco or Sacramento Chinatown 
to urge wetbacks and stowaway, anybody here on fake papers, to come to the 
city and get their files straightened but .... "Don't be a fool," somebody else 
would say. "It's a trap. You go in there saying you want to straighten out 
papers, they'll deport you. . . . So-and-so trusted them, and he was deported. 
They deported his children too." 
MAXINE HONG KINGSTON. THE WOMAN WARRIOR: MEMOIRS OF A GIRLHOOD AMONG 
GHOSTS 184 (1976). 
15. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
16. See generally Bill Ong Hing, The Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Community-Based Organizations, and the Legalization Experience: Lessons for the 
Self-Help Immigration Phenomenon, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 413-98 (1992) (discuss-
ing the success of the INS in using community organizations to build trust in immigrant 
communities). 
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permitted without the express written authorization of INS head-
quarters and the Associate Attorney General.17 Sale's memorandum 
cited the sharp criticism that the INS incurred after the sting from 
community groups and the media. It reminded INS officers that 
" 'Sting' operations have great potential for undermining the Ser-
vice's credibility and negatively affecting the goodwill the INS has 
established in the communities we serve."18 
Although not cited in Sale's memorandum, the Attorney General's 
Office had issued guidelines in 1984 that require INS officers to ob-
tain advance written approval of a wide variety of undercover opera-
tions.19 In December 1993, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner 
adopted additional formal administrative procedures to govern such 
"sting" operations.20 The new procedures continued the requirement 
of advance written approval of undercover operations, but added a 
new express prohibition against: 
[A]ny INS-directed activity intended to induce, through misrepresentation 
conveyed in print, by voice, or in person, specifically targeted law violators 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act to present themselves to an INS 
facility or office for administrative proceedings or to receive some seemingly 
valid INS benefit, for the purpose of apprehending them.21 
Thus, the INS Commissioner apparently banned the type of sting 
operation that was used in San Diego. Notwithstanding these new 
administrative procedures, many troubling issues remain regarding 
the use of sting operations by the INS. 
This article will discuss the legality of the San Diego sting opera-
tion used by the INS to execute deportation orders. It will analyze 
- the authority of the INS to conduct such a sting operation under the 
17. Memorandum from Chris Sale, Acting INS Commissioner, to District Direc-
tors, Chief Patrol Agents, and Officers in Charge (August 11, 1993), in INS Issues New 
Standards for Sting Operations, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1209 & app. IV (1993). 
18. Id. 
19. Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General's Guidelines on INS Under-
cover Operations (March 5, 1984) [hereinafter Guidelines] (on file with author). These 
Guidelines are discussed in Section III.A infra. See also INS Guidelines for Undercol'er 
Operations Uncovered, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 572 (1987) (discussing the Guidelines 
and the requirement of written approval by the INS Commissioner or the INS Associate 
Commissioner for Enforcement, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General 
for the Criminal Division). 
20. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, INS Commissioner, to District Directors, 
Chief Patrol Agents, and Officers-In-Charge (December 17, 1993) (on file with author). 
This document was obtained by the author in March 1994, pursuant to a Freedom of 
Information Act Request under 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552 (1988). See also Lenni B. Benson, 
INS Undercover Operations, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 777 {1994) (analyzing the new 
procedures and the conflicts between INS procedures and the Attorney General's 
Guidelines). 
21. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 20, at 2 (to be included as 
§ 20.017, INA Authorization Procedures for "Sting" Operations, of the INS Adminis-
trative Manual). This memorandum also lowers the level of review in the Attorney Gen· 
eral's Office from the Associate Attorney General to the Deputy Commissioner of the 
INS. Id. at 1. 
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regulations and statutes that govern the execution of final orders of 
deportation. The article also will identify the constitutional limita-
tions on such operations under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and will argue that INS stings used in civil proceedings 
or to enforce civil orders offend due process. Finally, the article will 
suggest that statutory changes should be made to block future un-
dercover operations and to provide aliens with more protection 
against outrageous government conduct. 
II. THE STING IN CONTEXT 
In the San Diego sting, the INS only targeted aliens who had out-
standing orders of deportation. Assuming that INS records were ac-
curate, the only individuals to receive the sting letter were those who 
already had been through administrative deportation procedures and 
had been found deportable. 
Nevertheless, the individual aliens still may have been entitled to 
statutory judicial review of their cases. The aliens also might have 
wished to seek discretionary administrative relief, such as a motion 
to reopen, because facts and circumstances had changed since the 
original hearing. Other aliens may have wanted to seek collateral 
review, perhaps by filing a writ of habeas corpus. It is also possible 
that some of the aliens apprehended in the sting had exhausted every 
feasible avenue of appeal or discretionary relief. 
Notwithstanding the aliens' possible statutory or discretionary 
rights to further review of their cases or their rights to remain in the 
United States, I believe the INS sting was not an appropriate use of 
INS authority. For the reasons discussed below, I believe the sting 
exceeded INS regulatory authority and violated due process. How-
ever, to fully understand the impact of a sting used to expel aliens -
even those with an outstanding order of deportation - it is impor-
tant to consider some of the classes of aliens that might have been 
affected, as well as the consequences of deportation itself. 
A. Deportation Scenarios 
An alien might have been ordered deported in absentia. She might 
have learned of the deportation order only when she was appre-
hended in the sting. If she can establish that she never received no-
tice of the deportation proceedings, she could file a motion to reopen 
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her case and the INS regulations would support that reopening.22 
In another scenario, the alien may have been ordered deported and 
may have appealed her deportation order to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA). The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
generally allows an alien ninety days from the date of the final order 
of deportation to file the petition for review.23 For most aliens, the 
filing of a petition for review creates an automatic stay of the depor-
tation order. In this scenario, the INS cannot lawfully remove the 
alien until judicial review is complete.24 In the window between issu-
ance of the final order and the filing of the petition for review, the 
alien is vulnerable to INS enforcement of the deportation order. If 
the INS removes the alien, his right to seek judicial review will 
end.25 
There are many areas in the complex appellate rules governing 
deportation or exclusion in which the alien could be vulnerable to 
deportation and to the loss of right to pursue judicial review. For 
example, an alien might have successfully defeated the government's 
order to show cause seeking her deportation. On appeal, the BIA 
might reverse and order the individual deported. The INS could then 
arrest the alien upon receipt of the BIA's decision, even though years 
may have passed since the original deportation hearing.26 
The alien also may have exhausted all administrative and judicial 
appeals. Even so, there are a variety of forms of discretionary relief, 
such as deferred deportation or the reinstatement of voluntary depar-
ture, which the alien still may ask the INS to consider. The chances 
of securing relief may be small, but nevertheless, removal and execu-
tion of the order of deportation would eliminate the ability of the 
alien to pursue such relief. 
22. 8 C.F.R. § 103 (1993). 
23. The period is reduced to 30 days for aggravated felons. Until the 1990 amend-
ments, an alien had six months to file the petition for review. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. 
§ l 105a(a)(l) (1988). 
24. The right of an automatic stay for aggravated felons was removed in recent 
amendments. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 513(a), 104 Stat. 5052 
(1990) (effective for petitions for review filed on or after January 28, 1991). Aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies must seek discretionary stays. For a discussion of stays for 
aggravated felons, see IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOIC 635-36 (4th 
ed. 1994). -
25. See the discussion of INA § 106 and the foreclosure of judicial review, in Sec-
tion II.B infra. 
26. In a case in which I was the attorney of record, five years after the alien pre-
vailed in the deportation hearing, the BIA reversed its ruling. The BIA mailed the deci-
sion to another attorney with the last name of "Benson." The alien learned of the adverse 
decision only when he received a Bag and Baggage letter, the "Notice to Report for 
Deportation." 
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B. The Legal Consequences of Deportation 
There are many consequences to the removal or departure of an 
alien from the United States under an order of deportation. The le-
gal consequence that is perhaps most central to the discussion of the 
San Diego sting is that the physical act of deportation effectively 
ends administrative or judicial review of the deportation order. 
Whether the alien left of his own volition or whether he was physi-
cally removed by the INS, his departure under a deportation order 
will end administrative deportation proceedings27 and the alien's 
right to file a motion to reopen or reconsider.28 More dramatically, 
the alien's departure often forecloses any opportunities for judicial 
review. Section 106(c) of the INA provides in part that: 
An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if 
the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as 
of right under the immigration laws and regulations or if he has departed 
from the United States after the issuance of the order.29 
An alien who does not seek a discretionary stay or file a petition for 
review under section 106 and is then removed, will by this section 
have lost the ability to pursue judicial review of the BIA determina-
tion. The harshness of this rule has led a few courts of appeals to 
create an exception to the bar where the INS has violated its own 
regulations in removing the alien or where the removal violates due 
process.30 
If the alien was not able to argue that the sting met one of the 
exceptions to the bar to judicial or administrative review, the alien 
might not have any forum in which to challenge the conduct of the 
INS. This procedural problem inherently protects the INS practice 
of removing an alien from the country after violating the alien's civil 
rights or government regulations. Many commentators have noted 
this glitch in the system.31 It may be one of the main reasons that 
27. See In re Yih-Hsiung Wang, 17 I. & N. Dec. 565, 567 (BIA 1980) (departure 
concludes the proceedings absent procedural defects). 
28. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1993). The regulations provide in relevant part: "Any depar-
ture from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings 
occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall consti-
tute a withdrawal of such motion." Id. 
29. INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. §1105a(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
30. See, e.g., Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977); Marrero v. INS, 990 
F.2d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1993). These exceptions will be discussed further as this article 
examines the legality of the sting operation. 
31. See, e.g., Stepnen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the INS: A Case for 
Civilian Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 24 (1994) (discussing the "forced 
migration" or deportation of aliens who may have been injured by INS behavior); see 
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inappropriate INS conduct is infrequently challenged successfully. 
There are many other consequences of deportation. For example, 
aliens who have been deported within the past five years are excluda-
ble from the United States, and cannot be admitted unless they se-
cure a waiver of excludability.32 These waivers are time-consuming 
and difficult to obtain.33 Aliens who otherwise may qualify for lawful 
immigration to the United States, such as those who have married 
U.S. citizens, will find their immigration blocked until the waiver 
can be processed.34 Aliens who may have held permanent resident 
status lose that status when they are deported or, in some circuits, if 
they fail to contest a finding of deportability.35 Once the alien has 
lost permanent residence, family members who might have spent 
years awaiting permanent resident classification under the Family-
also IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT MONITORING PROJECT, SEALING OUR BORDERS: 
THE HUMAN TOLL 17-41 {1992) (reporting on the administrative complaints filed against 
immigration officers). 
32. INA § 212(a)(6)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182{a){6)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Aliens con-
victed of an aggravated felony and who are subsequently deported are excludable for a 
period of 20 years. "Aggravated felony" is defined in INA § 101(a){43), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 110l{a){43) (Supp. V 1993), and includes convictions (including attempt or conspir-
acy to commit murder), trafficking in any controlled substance, trafficking in any fire-
arms or destructive devices, or any crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment 
imposed (regardless of suspension of sentence) is at least five years. 
33. The waiver is commonly referred to as an 1-212 waiver or, more formally, the 
Permission to Reapply for Admission After Deportation or Removal. The application 
procedure is discussed in THE IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS 
GUILD. IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE§ 5.6 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND DEFENSE]. This treatise notes that delays of one to four years arc not uncom-
mon. Id. at 5-42. 
34. A news article that reported the San Diego sting stated that one of the people 
apprehended in the sting, Antonio Martinez, appears to face this dilemma. Reza, supra 
note 1, at A23. Mr. Martinez is the beneficiary of an approved immigrant petition filed 
by his U.S. citizen wife. Id. His expulsion would preclude the issuance of an immigrant 
visa unless the INS grants an I-212 waiver of the ground of excludability. 
35. The courts of appeals differ widely in their view on the exact point in time in 
deportation proceedings when an alien loses lawful permanent resident status. Judge 
Trott, dissenting in Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1993), summarizes the vary-
ing standards determining when an alien will be denied relief as follows: 
{l) [I]n Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, 
when a deportation order becomes administratively final; (2) in Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia, when the order to show cause is issued; (3) in Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washing-
ton, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, when the Board may no 
longer reconsider or reopen the case; (4) in Connecticut, New York and 
Vermont, under a rule which is different from the rule in Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Texas, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin but not clearly stated; and (5) 
elsewhere, depending on the option chosen by the judges of the U.S. Courts 
of Appeal. 
Id. at 1152. 
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Based Second Preference of the INA will completely lose their abil-
ity to immigrate.36 Loss of permanent resident status also will pre-
clude the alien from use of the waiver of excludability available to 
returning residents. This waiver is known as the 212(c) waiver.37 In 
many situations, it is the only waiver that will allow an alien to con-
tinue to reside in the United States. 38 
One of the most dramatic results of deportation is that an alien 
who subsequently re-enters the United States without documentation 
can be prosecuted for a felony offense and fined, or can be impris-
oned for up to two years.39 The alien cannot, in many circumstances, 
collaterally attack the deportation order that made his or her subse-
quent re-entry a crime.4° Collateral attack is possible only where the 
alien can raise due process concerns establishing that the deportation 
36. 8 C.F.R. § 205.l(a)(9) (1993) (providing for automatic revocation of a rela-
tive visa petition upon loss of permanent residence except in cases of naturalization). At 
one point, persons chargeable to the quota for Mexico might wait 12 years before the 
priority date of their preference petition for a spouse or child became current and an 
immigrant visa became available. The February 1994 backlogs in the Family-Based Sec-
ond Preference, INA § 203(2)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993), for 
spouses and children (under 21) of permanent residents, were more than three years. As 
of April 1994, the priority date for the unmarried adult children (over 21) of permanent 
residents, INA § 203(2)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993), was standing 
still at a minimum of five years. See, e.g., Bureau of Consular Affairs, Immigrant Num-
bers for April 1994, VISA BULL., Apr. 1994, at I (recording the movement of preference 
petition priority dates). 
37. See INA§ 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(c) (Supp. V 1993). To meet the threshold 
of eligibility for this waiver, the individual must have maintained a lawful residence in 
the United States for at least seven years. See supra note 35; see also DAN KESSELBREN-
NER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § ll.4(c)(2) (rev. ed. 
1993). 
38. For example, a permanent resident who has been convicted of one of most drug 
offenses would not be able to use any other waiver to avoid deportation. If the INS 
removes the alien under an order of deportation, the alien's permanent resident status 
technically ends with the removal. Many aliens become eligible for this waiver after an 
order of deportation but before their actual departure, and they seek to reopen their 
deportation proceedings to apply for § 212(c) relief. See KESSELBRENNER & ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 37, § 1 I.4(c)(3). 
39. INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). The statute increases the length of im-
prisonment for felons and aggravated felons who reenter after deportation. INA § 276, 8 
U.S.C. § 1326(b), as amended by The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, § 7345(a)-(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988). The penalty is increased to 5 years if 
one is deported as a felon and to 15 years if deported as an aggravated felon. The term 
"Aggravated felony" is described in note 32, supra. 
Note that although an alien can be prosecuted for the crime of entry without inspec-
tion or entry via willfully false or misleading representations, prosecutions are rare and 
the first offense is classified as a misdemeanor. See INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) 
(Supp. V 1993). 
40. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987) (preserving 
limited collateral attack); KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 5.4(b). 
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hearing was fundamentally unfair, as when the nature of the hearing 
fundamentally precluded or eliminated judicial review.41 In some cir-
cuits, the alien must demonstrate actual prejudice. In other words, 
the alien must prove that she would have been entitled to some form 
of relief before a court will allow a collateral attack to set aside the 
deportation order. This is true even if the alien establishes that there 
was a fundamental error in the deportation proceedings.42 
As mentioned above, several courts have recognized an exception 
to the ban on judicial review if the alien can show that her removal 
was achieved by a violation of government regulations or a denial of 
due process. I will next address the authority of the INS to use un-
dercover operations, and whether the San Diego sting violated INS 
regulations. 
III. ANALYSIS OF INS STINGS UNDER INS REGULATIONS AND 
STATUTES 
Although there is no statute or regulation that expressly autho-
rizes an INS undercover operation, Congress has authorized a wide 
range of enforcement techniques that provide the INS with broad 
powers to enforce immigration laws. For example, the INS may in-
terrogate a person it believes to be an alien without first procuring a 
warrant.43 The INS also may conduct warrantless searches of vessels 
or cars within 100 miles of the U.S. border.44 In a recent case, 
United States v. Chen,45 the Ninth Circuit found that a warrantless 
search of a ship that was conducted 300 miles from shore was au-
thorized by the broad language of Section 103 of the INA, which 
describes the authority of the Attorney General to enforce the immi-
gration laws.46 The court of appeals found authority for the search in 
language stating that the Attorney General may perform "such 
other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under 
the provisions" of the INA.47 The Ninth Circuit found that Congress 
meant to authorize this search, notwithstanding its direct conflict 
with INS regulations that limit warrantless searches only to loca-
tions within JOO miles of the international border.48 
The search in Chen was the denouement of an undercover opera-
tion to apprehend alien smugglers. The Ninth Circuit opinion noted 
41. See United States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied., 488 U.S. 844 (1988). 
42. See United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992). 
43. INA § 287(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(l) (1988). 
44. 8 C.F.;R. § 287(a)(2) (1993). 
45. 2 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1558 ( 1994). 
46. INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988). 
47. INA§ 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). 
48. Chen, 2 F.3d at 333. 
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that the INS had obtained express approval of the extraterritorial 
undercover operation from the Undercover Operations Review Com-
mittee of the Department of Justice.49 This approval bolstered the 
argument that the INS had the Attorney General's authority to ex-
ceed the express 100-mile limitation of the regulation. But nowhere 
in the opinion did the court raise any challenge to the legality of the 
undercover operations themselves. 
A. INS Undercover Operations and Attorney General Guidelines 
The Attorney General's Guidelines on INS Undercover Opera-
tions, referred to in Chen, begin by reciting the statutory authority 
that allows the INS to conduct undercover operations: "The follow-
ing guidelines on use of undercover operations by the [INS] are is-
sued under authority of the Attorney General as provided in 28 
U.S.C. 509, 510, 533, and 8 U.S.C. 1103."50 
The first two statutes refer merely to the general authority of the 
Attorney General to allow the operations.51 Section 533 of Title 28 
provides that the Attorney General may appoint officials "to detect 
and prosecute crimes against the United States" and "to conduct 
such other investigations regarding official matters under the control 
of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be 
directed by the Attorney General."52 
The opening statement of the Attorney General's Guidelines re-
flects the purpose of INS undercover operations. The introduction 
asserts, without any citation to authority, that the use of undercover 
49. Id. at 334. 
50. Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1. 
51. 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988) provides: 
§509. Functions of the Attorn~y General. All functions of other officers of the 
Department of Justice and all functions of agencies and employees of the De-
partment of Justice are vested in the Attorney General except the functions -
(1) vested by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 in administrative law 
judges employed by the Department of Justice; 
(2) of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.; and 
(3) of the Board of Directors and officers of the Federal Prison Industries, 
Inc. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1988) provides: 
Id. 
§510. Delegation of authority. The Attorney General may from time to time 
make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance 
by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any 
function of the Attorney General. 
52. 28 u.s.c. § 533 (1988). 
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operations by the INS is a "lawful and essential technique."u3 
The Guidelines then define three categories of undercover opera-
tions and the corresponding review procedures within the Depart-
ment of Justice that must be followed prior to initiating an 
undercover operation. The type of undercover operation involved will 
require the consent of either: (1) the INS Commissioner, with the 
concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Di-
vision; (2) the Regional Commissioner; or (3) the District Director 
or Chief Patrol Agent.54 The "graver the risk of harm or intrusive-
ness, the higher the approval level required."1"' 
The Guidelines are written in a manner which limits the highest 
level of review to those situations identified as involving enumerated 
"sensitive circumstances."156 In essence, if the local officer believes 
the proposed sting technique or mode of undercover operation does 
not involve any "sensitive circumstance," the INS District Director 
or Chief Border Patrol Agent may assume that no authorization 
from superiors is required. The enumerated "sensitive circum-
stances" provide for high-level review in several situations. A high 
degree of scrutiny is appropriate if the INS operation may interfere 
with a confidential relationship or induce a false confidential rela-
tionship, such as when agents pose as attorneys or members of the 
clergy.157 Property matters also create a uniquely sensitive circum-
stance requiring the highest level of approval, such as when the INS 
uses funds to establish or operate a business or deposits funds in a 
bank or other financial institution.158 
Other "sensitive circumstances" are designated to avoid criminal 
entrapment. For example, the highest level of review is required 
whenever the INS is acting as a "major participant" in a smuggling 
operation, or when an undercover INS employee or agent must com-
mit a felony or other serious crime as a part of the operation.no 
Additionally, where the undercover operation involves a "sensitive 
circumstance," District Officers must seek prior written authoriza-
tion from the Commissioner and the Associate Attorney General. 
53. Guidelines, supra note 19, at 3. Although this statement appears to authorize 
general undercover operations as an investigatory technique, the procedural requirements 
of the Guidelines make it clear that requests for authorization must identify the "federal 
crimes" which have been or will be committed. Id. at 6-7. 
In a section labeled "General Authority," the Guidelines state: "The INS may conduct 
undercover operations pursuant to these guidelines when such operations advance the 
enforcement of criminal statutes assigned to the investigatory jurisdiction of the INS or 
when otherwise appropriate to carrying out the Service's investigative function." Id. at 3. 
54. Id. at 4. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 5-6. 
58. Id. at 6. 
59. Id. at 5. 
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The Guidelines itemize the contents of this request. Central to the 
request is the identification of the "criminal enterprise" under 
investigation. 60 
Even where a "sensitive circumstance" is not involved and the 
Guidelines simply delegate the authority to the District Director or 
Chief Border Patrol Agent to begin the operation, they require that 
the office involved prepare a written authorization request containing 
the following information: 
1. A summary of the operation, and facts or circumstances that reasona-
bly indicate that a federal crime, which is within the investigatory jurisdic-
tion of the INS, has or will be committed. 
2. Facts explaining why the undercover operation will be effective, what 
prior investigation has been conducted, as well as an estimate of the likeli-
hood that the operation will produce evidence of the alleged criminal con-
duct or criminal enterprise. 
3. An explanation that the operation will be conducted with minimum 
intrusion. 
4. An explanation that the operation does not involve a "sensitive circum-
stance," and that one is not expected to arise. 
5. An explanation of how any foreseeable participation in any illegal ac-
tivity or the making of false representations by an undercover employee is 
justified by one the following factors: 
a. It is necessary to obtain information or evidence necessary for 
"paramount prosecutive" purposes; 
b. It will establish or maintain the credibility or the cover of the 
persons involved in the investigation; or 
c. It will prevent or avoid the risk of death or serious bodily injury 
of the persons involved in the investigation. 
6. A statement indicating that the District Director or Chief Patrol 
Agent contacted the affected U.S. Attorney or Strike Force Chief and a 
statement describing their position towards the operation.61 
When the request is submitted to the INS Commissioner, it is as-
signed to the Undercover Operations Review Committee. The Com-
mittee includes enforcement personnel and other INS employees 
designated by the Commissioner, as well as attorneys appointed by 
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.62 
The Committee reviews the authority request and may recommend 
approval to the Commissioner. In evaluating the benefits of the oper-
ation, the Committee is charged with examining its cost and other 
relevant factors including: the risk of harm to employees; the risk of 
financial loss to private individuals and businesses; the risk of liabil-
ity and loss to the government; the risk of harm to reputation; the 
60. Id. at 9-10. 
61. Id. at 6-7, 13. 
62. Id. at 11. 
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risk of harm to private or confidential relationships; the risk of inva-
sion of privacy; the degree to which undercover employees might 
"entrap" a subject; and the "suitability" of the activity 
contemplated. 63 
Finally, as a general caveat, the Guidelines state that the District 
Director or Chief Patrol Agent must consult with the Central Office 
(now called "Headquarters") whenever "a serious legal, ethical, 
prosecutive, or Departmental policy question is presented by the op-
eration. "64 If the District Director or Chief Patrol Agent approved 
the operation on his or her own authority, the District Director must 
submit a request to the INS Commissioner for continued authoriza-
tion of the existing application.65 
Before the July 1993 sting, Turnage and his subordinates at the 
San Diego District Office apparently believed that promises of work 
authorization and "amnesty" did not involve a "sensitive circum-
stance," and therefore did not require Commissioner pre-approval of 
the undercover operation.66 In addition, the District Director appears 
to have violated the Guidelines when his office failed to prepare the 
written report that must follow every undercover operation not au-
thorized by the Review Committee.67 
One of the flaws of the approval delegation system detailed in the 
Guidelines is apparent in the San Diego sting. The San Diego Dis-
trict did not believe the sting raised any "serious legal" or ethical 
questions that would have required contact with the INS Commis-
sioner and submission of the written authorization request. 
Moreover, the Guidelines repeatedly indicate that the undercover 
operations are needed to prevent, detect, or prosecute "criminal" vio-
lations. As previously noted, in most cases the failure of aliens to 
appear at deportation proceedings after receiving a Bag and Baggage 
Letter is not a crime. Even for the few classes of deportable aliens 
who could be prosecuted for failure to appear, there is no history or 
practice of prosecution under this statute. In fact, deportation orders 
are issued after civil proceedings. 
Since the Guidelines were enacted to regulate criminal investiga-
tions, their misuse could provide a legal basis for a challenge to the 
operation. The Guidelines expressly try to prevent a subject of an 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 17. 
65. Id. 
66. Marcus Stern, Federal Officials Take the Sting out of INS, SAN DIEGO 
UNJON-TRIB., Aug. 13, 1993, at B-1, B-4. "The operation was hatched at the INS San 
Diego headquarters and approved by INS regional headquarters in Laguna Niguel and 
by midlevel headquarters officials in Washington." Id. 
67. See Guidelines, supra note 19, at 17. The San Diego District Office did not 
produce such an authorization request in response to a Freedom of Information Act Re-
quest filed by the author in January 1994. 
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undercover operation from using the Guidelines to create legal 
rights. In part VII of the Guidelines, the following statement 
appears: 
Reservation 
These guidelines on the use of undercover operations are set forth solely for 
the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not in-
tended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substan-
tive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or 
criminal, and they do not place any limitations on otherwise lawful investi-
gative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.68 
This nicely drafted paragraph might be sufficient to prevent a le-
gal challenge based solely on the Guidelines. The failure to comply 
with these Guidelines and the absence of any express statutory or 
regulatory authority for the INS to conduct undercover operations 
might, however, be part of a challenge to administrative action as 
violating the scope of the agency's authority or ultra vires. 
As noted above in the Chen case, the lack of specific statutory or 
regulatory authority to conduct a warrantless search in international 
waters 300 miles from shore led a U.S. District Court to dismiss an 
indictment that was later reinstated by the Court of Appeals in part 
because the INS had followed the undercover Guidelines.69 If, de-
spite the "Reservation" provision, a court can use the Guidelines to 
uphold government action, it is possible that individuals could use 
the Guidelines to challenge government action.70 
B. The Revised INS Policy 
Shortly after the San Diego sting, Acting Commissioner Chris 
Sale issued a memorandum to INS District Offices and agents in-
structing them about new procedures for undercover operations.71 
Citing a need for special caution "concerning the Service's standing 
in the community and the social sensitivity of immigration enforce-
ment actions," the memorandum required that "all future operations 
68. Id. at 19. 
69. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
70. But see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1511 (11th Cir. 
1992) (INS Guidelines on interdiction of aliens on international waters did not create 
substantive enforceable rights), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992). The dissent in this 
case believes the Administrative Procedure Act does allow a cause of action based on 
INS regulations and guidelines. Id. at 1519-24 (Hatchett, J., dissenting); see also Mon-
tilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that violations of procedures 
which are not yet formal regulations may state a cause of action even where the internal 
procedure is more rigorous than otherwise required by statute) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974)). 
71. Memorandum from Chris Sale, supra note 17. 
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employing 'sting' techniques must be approved, in writing, by the 
Executive Associate Commissioner, Operations and by the Associate 
Attorney General prior to implementation."72 The memorandum re-
affirmed the requirement that a complete description of the opera-
tion be submitted at least thirty days in advance of its proposed 
start. 
In December 1993, the new INS Commissioner, Doris Meissner, 
revised the August 11th memorandum and established a more de-
tailed procedure for the authorization of sting operations.73 Her 
memorandum continued the requirement that all undercover opera-
tions be authorized in writing and added an important prohibition. 
The memorandum specifically prohibited any sting operation that 
includes: 
[A]ny INS-directed activity intended to induce, through misrepresentation 
conveyed in print, by voice, or in person, specifically targeted law violators 
of the [INA] to present themselves to an INS facility or office for adminis-
trative proceedings or to receive some seemingly valid INS benefit, for the 
purpose of apprehending them.74 
The memorandum shows that it is clearly Commissioner Meiss-
ner's intention to prohibit sting operations that involve false state-
ments relating to work authorization or other immigration benefits. 
Yet the memorandum assumes that sting operations could be used 
apart from criminal enforcement. However, there is no statutory ci-
tation authorizing undercover operations in a civil context other than 
a general reference to the authority of the Attorney General to en-
force the immigration laws. 
C. Analysis of INS Regulations Related to the Sting Operation 
This Section will consider whether the San Diego sting operation 
violated specific INS regulations. Generally, the federal courts have 
allowed aliens to challenge INS actions which violate INS regula-
tions. The Supreme Court strongly articulated the requirement that 
the INS follow its own regulations in Accardi v. Shaughnessy,71., and 
this principle became known as the Accardi doctrine. This doctrine 
has been widely used to require administrative agencies to follow 
their own regulations.76 It is based on the fundamental concept of 
72. Id. 
73. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 20. 
74. Id. at 2. 
75. 347 U.S. 260 (1954). In the earlier case of Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 
(1945), the Supreme Court had reversed a deportation order because the government 
failed to follow its own regulation regarding the form and type of evidence to be used in 
the proceeding. 
76. See Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 629 (1974). See the discussion of equitable estoppel against the INS in Section IV, 
infra. 
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due process - that the government must apply rules fairly and uni-
formly. The Accardi doctrine holds that an agency cannot issue rules 
that affect individual rights and then choose to disregard them.77 
Under this doctrine, an alien can seek a new deportation hearing 
based on the INS' failure to follow its regulations. 
In the Ninth Circuit, before a new hearing will be ordered, the 
alien must demonstrate that the regulations were designed to benefit 
the alien and that he or she was prejudiced by the INS' failure to 
adhere to them.78 In adopting the Ninth Circuit's modification of the 
doctrine, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that prejudice may 
be presumed where compliance with the rule is mandated by the 
Constitution or "where an entire procedural framework designed to 
insure the fair processing of an action affecting an individual is cre-
ated but then not followed by an agency."79 
As mentioned above, no regulations specifically address under-
cover operations. Nevertheless, the San Diego sting, carried out to 
execute outstanding orders of deportation, may have violated the 
INS' own regulations governing the execution of deportation 
orders.80 
The regulations that concern the execution of a deportation order 
allow the INS to apprehend an alien and hold her in custody for 
seventy-two hours before executing the final order of deportation.81 
The regulations also allow the alien to sign a waiver of the seventy-
two-hour delay.82 Assuming that aliens apprehended in the San Di-
ego sting were under a final order of deportation and that the INS 
complied with the seventy-two-hour delay or obtained signed waiv-
ers, the sting operation would not, on the surface, appear to violate 8 
C.F.R. § 243.3 (1993). However, the regulations might have been 
violated by this sting operation if (1) the alien was represented by 
counsel and counsel was not notified, or (2) the alien could demon-
strate that the waiver was not a "knowing and voluntary" waiver as 
required by the regulation.83 To analyze these issues, it is important 
77. Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-67. 
78. See Calderon-Medina v. United States, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979). But 
see Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1991) (specifically refusing to adopt 
a prejudice requirement). 
79. See In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325, 329 (BIA 1980). 
80. It is my contention that all sting operations used to enforce non-criminal immi-
gration laws raise due process concerns. The general due process considerations are 
raised in Section IV, infra. 
81. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b) (1993). 
82. Id. The waiver must be "knowing and voluntary." Id. 
83. Id. 
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to have some background about the history of INS enforcement of 
deportation orders and about the prior regulation, which required 
advance notice before arrest for deportation. 
I. The Statutory Right to Counsel 
Until 1986, the INS regulations required that the INS send the 
alien a Bag and Baggage Letter.84 The purpose of the letter was to 
allow the alien time to prepare for departure. Even more signifi-
cantly, the letter signalled that the alien must take action if he 
wished to prevent deportation. Depending on the procedural posture 
of the case, the alien would seek a discretionary stay of deportation, 
file a petition for review with the court of appeals, or file a writ of 
habeas corpus and request a stay to prevent removaJ.8 G 
In 1986, the INS amended the regulation to delete the require-
ment of a Bag and Baggage letter because the INS found that sev-
enty-six percent of the aliens ordered to surrender failed to appear.86 
The INS argued that the Bag and Baggage procedure interfered 
with the "orderly and just administration" of the immigration 
laws.87 While the physical presence of the alien within the United 
States is essential to obtaining judicial review, the INS maintained 
that the regulation eliminating the requirement of written notice 
prior to execution of the deportation order was not substantive in 
nature and did not affect constitutional rights.88 
Although not addressed in the regulatory comments, many advo-
cates believe the change was made to reverse a series of Ninth Cir-
cuit decisions (described below), which used the failure of the INS 
to provide a copy of the Bag and Baggage Letter to the alien's attor-
ney as a basis for finding that the deportation orders had not been 
legally executed and were therefore void. A second and very impor-
tant ground for the Ninth Circuit decisions was that the successful 
84. See supra note 12. 
85. See INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988). The right to appeal is not com-
pletely open-ended. Aliens who wish to file a petition for review must file within 90 days 
of the final decision of the BIA, or within 30 days if the aliens are considered to be 
aggravated felons. If that time has passed, the alien may have only the writ of habeas 
corpus as a final method of seeking review of the deportation order. For a discussion of 
the proper avenues to seek judicial review or a stay of an order of deportation, see Chap· 
ters 9 and IO of IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE, supra note 33. 
86. See 51 Fed. Reg. 3471 (1986). The INS does not say what portion of the 76% 
of the aliens failing to appear upon receipt of a Bag and Baggage letter went on to 
pursue lawful judicial review or other permissible avenues of staying the deportation 
order. 
87. Id. 
88. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,042 (1986). In the comment accompanying the notice of the 
change in the regulations concerning the removal of the Bag and Baggage letter require-
ment, the INS stated, "The rule is procedural and not substantive in nature; neither 
constitutional due process not [sic] statutory language require provision of such a no-
tice." 51 Fed. Reg. 3471 (1986). 
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removal of the aliens also would have ended their ability to seek ju-
dicial review. Thus, the Ninth Circuit had effectively carved out an 
exception to the absolute rule that physical removal ends judicial re-
view under Section 106 of the INA, in large part because the regula-
tions required advance notice before executing the deportation order 
and that all notice had to be furnished to the alien's attorney.89 
In the first Ninth Circuit case, Mendez v. INS,90 Mr. Mendez was 
found deportable as an alien who had been convicted of a crime of 
moral turpitude with a sentence of at least one year. He appealed 
the deportation order to the BIA. Sixteen days after the BIA dis-
missed his appeal, the court in which he was convicted vacated his 
original criminal sentence and reduced it to nine months. This vaca-
tion of the original sentence removed the ground of deportability. 
Twenty-four days after the BIA dismissal, the INS mailed Mr. 
Mendez a Notice to Appear for Deportation.91 The INS did not no-
tify Mr. Mendez's attorney of record. Mr. Mendez reported to the 
INS as requested and explained that his sentence had been vacated. 
Despite this, the INS immediately deported Mr. Mendez, without 
giving him a chance to contact his lawyer. 
The Ninth Circuit found that deporting Mr. Mendez without 
sending notice to the counsel of record violated both regulatory and 
statutory rights to counsel.92 Because the Ninth Circuit found that 
the INS had violated its own procedural regulations, it did not reach 
89. As previously noted, the ability to seek judicial review after removal would be 
of particular importance to the aliens deported after apprehension in the San Diego sting 
operation, because it might provide their only forum in which to challenge the legality of 
the sting and to prevent the dramatic legal consequences of an executed order of deporta-
tion. See supra Section II. 
90. 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977). 
91. The regulations in effect until 1986 required the INS to send the notice 72 
hours in advance of the time set for the execution of the deportation order. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 243.3 (1985) (amended 1986). The relevant text of the prior regulation provided: 
Id. 
Once an order of deportation becomes final, an alien, not in the physical cus-
tody of the Service, shall be given not less than 72 hours advance notice in 
writing of the time and place of his surrender for deportation. . . . The ad-
vance notice requirement above does not preclude taking an alien into custody 
at any time, including any time within the 72 hour period. . . . However, in 
such an instance, the alien's deportation shall not be effected prior to the expi-
ration of 72 hours from the time of apprehension or of the 72 hour notice 
period, whichever is less. 
92. Mendez, 563 F.2d at 959. The regulation involved was 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a) 
(1993), which provided that whenever notice was required to be given to an alien, the 
same notice must be given to the attorney of record. The court cited a statutory right to 
counsel in INA§ 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988). See GORDON & MAILMAN, supra 
note 12, § 72.04[12][D] (discussing the right to counsel in deportation hearings). 
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the issue of whether the INS action had violated constitutionally 
protected due process. It ruled that the section 106(c) bar to judicial 
review did not apply to aliens who had been removed illegally by the 
government. 93 
In a later case, Zepeda-Melendez v. INS,94 the Ninth Circuit 
again addressed the requirement of advance notice to the alien and 
his counsel. In that case, the alien already was in INS custody dur-
ing the proceedings and was removed without prior written notice to 
the alien or his counsel. The alien sought review of his deportation, 
arguing that the failure to provide written advance notice violated 
the regulation requiring notice and also violated his statutory right 
to counsel.95 The INS argued that the notice requirement did not 
apply to aliens already held in INS custody. The Ninth Circuit 
found that, regardless of whether the alien was in or out of custody, 
"an alien's counsel must be made aware of the alien's deportation in 
order to provide representation."96 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
INS' failure to inform the attorney of record that the alien was 
about to be deported violated the alien's statutory right to counsel 
under section 242(b) of the INA.97 
93. Mendez, 563 F.2d at 958. Not all of the federal courts of appeals have agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit exception to the bar to further judicial review after the departure 
or removal of the alien. The Fifth Circuit, in Quezada v. INS, 898 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 
1990), held that once an alien has been deported, the court has no jurisdiction to consider 
a petition for review under the plain, unequivocal language of INA § 106(c). Id. at 476. 
In Quezada, the Fifth Circuit relied on its earlier dicta in Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 
F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the court had characterized the Mendez ex-
ception as a "sinkhole" where the exception would swallow the rule. Quezada, 898 F.2d 
at 476. The Tenth Circuit also has refused to allow review once the alien has been de-
ported. See Saadi v. INS, 912 F.2d 428 {10th Cir. 1990) (a per curiam decision which 
relies on the language of the statute; there was no allegation of illegal execution of the 
deportation order or of a violation of due process). In a 1993 decision, the Second Circuit 
squarely adopted the Fifth Circuit position that because the language of INA § 106(c) is 
"unequivocal" if an alien has been removed from the United States, the court of appeals 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the deportation proceeding. Roldan v. Racette, 
984 F.2d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1993). 
Other circuit courts have created an exception to the bar to further judicial review 
where the alien can raise a "colorable claim" that due process was violated. See Marrero 
v. INS, 990 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1993) (due process allegation concerning adequate time to 
retain counsel and failure to properly serve the Order to Show Cause); see also Juarez v. 
INS, 732 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating a willingness to find a due process exception); 
Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1993) (removing an alien who 
had raised "good faith" challenges to a deportation order would raise "significant equita-
ble, if not constitutional concerns"); Joehar v. INS, 957 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dis-
cussing the Mendez exception without adopting it). 
94. 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984). 
95. Id. at 287. 
96. Id. at 289. 
97. Id. As this article was being finalized for publication, a panel of three Ninth 
Circuit judges issued an opinion cutting back on the Mendez exception and limiting the 
scope of the Zepeda-Melendez requirement of notice to counsel. In Arreaza-Cruz v. INS 
39 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994), the court ruled that where the BIA found the alien deport-
able and granted a 30 day period of voluntary departure, the subsequent failure to notify 
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Due to regulatory changes, an alien apprehended in a sting opera-
tion can no longer demand the advance warning of a Bag and Bag-
gage Letter.98 However, the language of these Ninth Circuit cases 
supports the argument that the statutory and constitutional right to 
an attorney prohibits the removal of an alien who is represented by 
counsel unless prior notice is given to. that counsel. The INS regula-
tions concerning representation specifically provide that where the 
INS is required to give notice to the alien, the INS also must give 
the same notice to the alien's attorney or representative of record.99 
And, although the current language of the deportation regulation 
does not require advance notice of the intention to apprehend the 
alien and execute the deportation order, the INS is required to serve 
the alien with a Form I-294.Ioo Based on the regulation requiring 
notice to the counsel and alien, and the holding of Zepeda-Melendez, 
it appears that the alien's attorney must also be given this form and 
must be notified that the alien is in custody.IoI 
2. A Knowing and Voluntary Waiver 
The aliens who were arrested in the sting operation were entitled 
to a seventy-two-hour delay of their deportation. While it was per-
missible for the alien to waive that delay, the waiver must have been 
counsel of the imminent execution of the order of deportation seven weeks following the 
expiration of the period of voluntary departure did not violate the statutory right to coun-
sel. 39 F.3d at 911. Further, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the INS did not have to hold 
Mr. Arreaza for 72 hours prior to the execution of the order of deportation because the 
court interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b) as firmly establishing that the 72 hour period be-
gan to run from the date of service of the final order of deportation when the alien is not 
in custody at the time of the service of the final order. 39 F.3d at 911. This decision 
might indicate that the Ninth Circuit is moving away from the broader due process pro-
tections suggested in Mendez and Zepeda-Melendez, and that it will be much harder for 
aliens removed by the INS to argue exceptions to the bar to judicial review found in 
INA§ 106. 
98. See supra note 12. 
99. 8 C.F.R. § 292.S(a) (1993). 
100. INS Operating Instruction § 243.3(c). This form must recite the waiver lan-
guage if the INS is not going to wait the 72-hour period before deportation. But see 
Arreaza-Cruz v. INS, 39 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994). This operating instruction was not 
examined in Arreaza-Cruz. 
101. The INS apparently believes that only telephonic notice to an attorney of 
record is required. On Form I-294, Notice of Country to Which Deportation Has Been 
Directed and Penalty for Re-Entry Without Permission, if the alien is waiving the 72-
hour hold, there is a space for the deportation officer to note that he or she called the 
attorney of record (if applicable). See INS Operating Instruction § 243.3(c). However, 8 
C.F.R. § 292.S(a) (1993) states that the attorney must be served whenever the alien 
must be served. 
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"knowing and voluntary."102 Aliens who were not told of their rights 
to seek additional review of the outstanding deportation order or to 
request discretionary relief may not have made a knowing and volun-
tary waiver because they would nov have known what rights they 
were giving up. 
However, even if the aliens were told what rights they were waiv-
ing, a waiver could still be invalid if it was not express. In the case of 
Montilla v. JNS,103 although the immigration judge had informed 
Mr. Montilla of his right to counsel, the Second Circuit found that 
the judge failed to follow INS regulations concerning the alien's 
right to counsel in deportation proceedings because the judge in-
ferred a waiver of that right from Mr. Mantilla's silence and appear-
ance without an attorney. In finding the waiver "unknowing and 
involuntary," the Second Circuit noted that the BIA had set forth a 
"meticulous care" standard to determine whether the waiver of the 
right to counsel was competently and knowingly made.104 
In Padilla-Agustin v. Ins,1°15 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the INS 
notice of appeal form and found that the inadequacy of the forms 
and instructions created a constitutional denial of due process. The 
court ruled that the form did not adequately explain the alien's need 
to state the grounds of his appeal with specificity.106 The court noted 
that immigration laws and regulations are exceedingly complex and 
that due process requires aliens who seek to appeal to be given a fair 
opportunity to present their cases.107 
Cases such as Montilla and Padilla-Agustin strongly support a 
due process challenge to the INS waiver language on the 1-294 form, 
which only discusses the waiver of the seventy-two-hour waiting pe-
riod and fails to explain the consequences of removal. Accordingly, 
an alien might be able to set aside his deportation if she were re-
moved after the insufficient warning on Form I-294. 
D. Other Regulations Governing INS Actions 
The INS is a division of the Department of Justice, and INS per-
sonnel are subject to regulations governing the professional conduct 
of the department's employees.108 Employees who fail to follow INS 
regulations, including the regulation requiring notice to counsel, 
could be subject to discipline by the Department of Justice. While 
these regulations might not create substantive rights for the aliens 
102. 8 C.F.R. § 243.3(b) (1993). 
103. 926 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 1991). 
104. Id. (quoting Matter of Gutierez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 226, 228 (BIA 1977)). 
105. 21 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1994). 
106. Id. at 975. The form in question was Form EOIR-26. 
107. Id. at 977. 
108. See INS Operating Instruction § 207; 8 C.F.R. § 287 (1993). 
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who were harmed by the sting operation, they could add weight to 
the constitutional due process arguments discussed below. Other ef-
fects of filing disciplinary charges might be deterrence and the pre-
vention of future unauthorized sting operations by INS officials.109 
Moreover, attorneys representing the INS who knew that the INS 
was purposely and intentionally not contacting aliens' attorneys of 
record might be in violation of ethical rules controlling the state 
bar.110 Ethical rules prohibit lawyers from directly communicating 
with a person who is represented by another lawyer without first no-
tifying that counsel. m 
IV. STING OPERATIONS As A VIOLATION OF DUE 
PROCESS 
Having explored statutory and regulatory arguments that might 
be raised to challenge the San Diego sting, I now turn to constitu-
tional due process arguments. The focus of this discussion will be on 
the San Diego sting. However, as a general principle, due process 
considerations might prohibit the use of any undercover operation as 
a tool to gather evidence for a civil immigration proceeding or to 
enforce deportation or exclusion orders. 
A. Aliens Are Entitled to "Some" Due Process of Law 
Aliens are "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment and, ac-
cordingly, are entitled to due process of law.112 The amount of pro-
cess due to an alien depends in large part on the legal classification 
109. The presence of these types of disciplinary rules and procedures was a part of 
the Supreme Court's justification for refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to deporta-
tion proceedings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984). See gener-
ally Rosenbaum, supra note 31 (discussing INS disciplinary actions). 
llO. See generally Robert G. Heiserman & Linda K. Pacun, Professional Respon-
sibility in Immigration Practice and Government Service, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 971, 
995-96 (1985). 
ll l. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). Attorney 
General Janet Reno has recently proposed regulations which would govern and restrict 
the ability of government attorneys to contact represented parties. 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Mar. 3, 1994). Although not specifically 
mentioned, INS attorneys should be covered by these new regulations as other attorneys 
"employed by the Department of Justice [and] authorized to conduct criminal or civil 
law enforcement proceedings on behalf of the United States." Id. at 10,100. 
112. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (the 14th Amendment is not 
limited to citizens but protects all persons within the United States); Wong Wing v. 
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 {1896) (aliens, whether in the United States lawfully 
or not, are entitled to 5th and 6th Amendment protections). For a discussion of the 
historical development of due process and other constitutional rights of aliens, see 
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of the proceeding. Over the years, courts have repeatedly character-
ized deportation proceedings as "civil, not criminal" in nature.113 In 
the landmark case of Bridges v. Wixon the Supreme Court stated: 
Though ... not technically a criminal proceeding, [a deportation proceed-
ing visits] a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right 
to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a 
penalty - at times a most serious one - cannot be doubted. Meticulous 
care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that 
liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.114 
Despite this careful language, in reality the rights of aliens in de-
portation proceedings are much more limited than in criminal pro-
ceedings. For example, indigent aliens do not have the right to 
counsel at the government's expense in deportation or exclusion pro-
ceedings.1111 The prohibition on bills of attainder118 or ex post facto 
laws117 do not apply, and there is no right to a speedy trial.118 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza119 that 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule need not be applied to bar 
the introduction of illegal evidence in deportation proceedings. The 
Supreme Court based its decision on the important distinction be-
tween civil and criminal proceedings. According to the majority, the 
need for the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings was obvi-
ated by opportunities for aliens to complain of improper conduct by 
INS officers, and by the lesser liberty interests at stake as compared 
to those of a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
and other courts have repeatedly ruled that aliens are entitled to pro-
tection of the right to a proceeding that meets the standards of fun-
damental fairness inherent in our understanding of due process of 
law.120 Importantly, in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the exclusionary rule might be used if there was a 
policy of widespread abuse or egregious violations which transgress 
notions of fundamental fairness. 121 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Con-
stitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990}. 
113. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
114. Id. at 154. 
115. The alien's right to counsel is expressly protected in the INA. See INA 
§§ 292, 242(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1252(b) (1988). The extent to which the right to 
counsel found in the 6th Amendment is the basis for the alien's right to counsel in civil 
deportation proceedings is disputed. See generally GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 12. 
116. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995 
(1986). 
117. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952). 
118. Argiz v. INS, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983). 
119. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
120. Id. at 1051 n.5. 
121. Id. at 1050-51. 
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B. Does a Sting Operation Violate Due Process? 
Usually, due process rights are analyzed under two broad catego-
ries: "procedural" and "substantive" due process. Procedural due 
process refers to the right to fair procedures and an opportunity to 
be heard.122 Substantive due process refers to the fundamental rights 
and liberties of individuals who are entitled to, and therefore cannot 
be arbitrarily denied, constitutional protection, and individuals who 
have the right to be free from outrageous or unconscionable govern-
mental conduct.123 Both procedural and substantive due process 
claims can be used to protect alien rights.124 
1. Procedural Due Process 
The San Diego sting operation provoked a number of aliens to ap-
pear voluntarily at the INS office to receive promised work authori-
zation benefits. Instead, these individuals were apprehended, and 
several were immediately expelled from the country. The expulsions 
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
123. I will focus on the substantive due process cases which discuss whether gov-
ernment conduct is outrageous or unconscionable rather than on those cases concerning a 
protected liberty interest. It might be possible to create a substantive due process argu-
ment by asserting that the alien has a liberty interest that is violated by undercover 
operations. However, recent Supreme Court cases would indicate that this argument 
would most likely fail. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (majority found 
no liberty interest in juvenile alien's challenge to INS regulations concerning release 
from detention prior to deportation or exclusion hearings; concurring opinion found the 
regulation met a heightened level of scrutiny that satisfied due process); see also Collins 
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (articulating a standard of cautious 
expansion of liberty interests). 
124. Although both procedural and substantive due process claims can be brought, 
many commentators have noted that procedural arguments succeed where substantive 
claims fail. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 
(1992); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 
965. The main obstacle to the development of alien substantive rights has been the ple-
nary power doctrine. This doctrine argues that Congress has plenary power to define the 
rights of aliens as an inherent power to define the nation's sovereignty. The degree to 
which the plenary power doctrine survives intact is debatable. I have not chosen to dis-
cuss the plenary power doctrine in part because I believe that the use of undercover 
operations to enforce deportation orders in no way touches on issues of national sover-
eignty. Further, the doctrine would not unduly control, although it may shadow, the con-
stitutional due process analysis. 
For a discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigra-
tion Law and the Principle of Plenary Constitutional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255; 
Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); 
Motomura, supra note 112. See also Brian K. Bates & Bruce A. Hake, A Tale of Two 
Cities: Due Process and the Plenary Power Doctrine, 92-94 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Apr. 
1992, at 1. 
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terminated the aliens' rights to further discretionary relief and to 
administrative and judicial review. As discussed above, the Ninth 
Circuit has allowed exceptions to this absolute rule only where aliens 
have shown the expulsion was illegally executed, or where other cir-
cuits have expressed a willingness to continue judicial review because 
the alien has raised a colorable claim of a due process violation.1211 
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether failure to pro-
vide notice to the alien before executing the deportation order vio-
lated due process because the INS had violated statutory or 
regulatory rights. 
If an alien deported pursuant to the sting were to challenge the 
expulsion as a violation of due process, the Ninth Circuit (and possi-
bly the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits) might find that, given the 
serious legal effects of the expulsion, fundamental fairness requires 
that the alien, at a minimum, be given an opportunity to avail her-
self of statutory rights to judicial review and regulatory rights to 
seek discretionary relief.126 
The usual procedural due process analysis begins with the balanc-
ing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.121 Under this test, a court 
must consider the private interest at stake, the government interest 
involved, and the increase in the accuracy of determinations that 
would be gained from added procedures or precaution.128 To apply 
this balancing test to a sting aimed at individual aliens, one must 
weigh the interests of the alien and the increase in decisional accu-
racy that further process could bring against the interest of the gov-
ernment in expeditious enforcement. 
The individual, private interests involved are the alien's rights (1) 
to remain in the United States, (2) to seek administrative or judicial 
review afforded by Congress, and (3) to seek relief from deportation, 
such as a discretionary grant or a reinstatement of voluntary depar-
ture, which would not in itself be an obstacle to future entries by the 
alien. In addition, aliens may have other protected interests, such as 
the statutory right to counsel. 
The government has a legitimate interest in enforcing deportation 
orders and in the efficient use of resources to remove aliens who are 
under final orders of deportation.129 Another interest might be to 
find those aliens who have evaded detection.130 The INS has reported 
125. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. 
126. An example of discretionary relief would be to request a reinstatement of 
voluntary departure. Leaving under a grant of voluntary departure has fewer legal conse-
quences. See IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE, supra note 33, § 8.6. 
127. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
128. Id. at 335. 
129. In defense of the San Diego sting operation, the INS claimed that the agency 
did not have the resources to "knock on 600 doors." Jahn, supra note 4. 
130. This motive would not appear to be present in the San Diego sting, as the 
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that it has great difficulty achieving voluntary compliance with Bag 
and Baggage Letters, which inform aliens of the date and time that 
the deportation order will be executed. One report said that seventy-
six percent of the aliens failed to respond to these letters.131 Mem-
bers of Congress have repeatedly called for stricter enforcement, and 
the Clinton Administration has increased the number of border pa-
trol officers. The INS has a legitimate interest in enforcing deporta-
tion orders. Failure to execute the orders would vitiate a large part 
of the federal government's power to control immigration, because to 
control the borders, the government must have the power to prevent 
illegal entry and to remove those who escape detection or who violate 
immigration laws after entry. 
The third factor of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test re-
quires an analysis of how more process would increase the accuracy 
of government decision making. The arrest after the sting undoubt-
edly took the aliens by surprise and gave them little or no opportu-
nity to consult with counsel. The apprehended aliens could argue 
that they could have properly prepared requests for discretionary re-
lief only if they had notice of the execution of the deportation order. 
Further, the aliens need to be afforded an opportunity to challenge 
the underlying premise that they are subject to a valid deportation 
order, because as the facts of this situation attest, the INS does 
make mistakes and might have arrested people who are not actually 
subject to deportation.132 Finally, as previously explained, the suc-
cessful removal of the alien would potentially raise a bar to further 
judicial review because of the statutory prohibition on review once 
the alien has physically left the United States.133 Accuracy in deci-
sion making is safeguarded by opportunities for administrative and 
judicial review. This loss of all rights to further judicial review and 
to challenge the government conduct adds great weight to the alien's 
claim of a procedural due process violation in the sting operation and 
subsequent deportation. Further, there is the huge loss of trust in the 
INS that will make future dealings with many aliens more difficult. 
In balancing the government's goal of executing outstanding or-
ders and the alien's rights to due process, a court may well find that, 
aliens were located by mailing letters to addresses in INS files. 
131. See supra note 86. · 
132. In newspaper accounts, the INS reported that a number of aliens were re-
leased and not immediately removed because they were able to convince the INS officer 
that the deportation order was not final, or in the case of at least two individuals, that 
they had become lawful permanent residents. See supra note 3. 
133. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. 
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under the totality of the circumstances, the government's interests in 
efficiency, and even in enforcing immigration laws, were outweighed 
by the need to provide fundamental fairness to the aliens. In part, 
this might be based on the fact that the efficiency goal was not well 
served by using the sting as an enforcement technique. The San Di-
ego INS sent 600 registered letters and reported that approximately 
sixty people appeared in response. This ten percent response rate is 
much less than the twenty-five percent rate reported in response to 
the usual Bag and Baggage Letter.134 Further, a large number of the 
aliens apprehended in the sting were released because the INS dis-
covered that some had established other rights to remain in the 
United States, or because the INS had arrested a person of the same 
· name who was not the person intended to be deported. Ultimately, 
the INS deported twenty people pursuant to this sting. 
Finally, a court might conclude that the sting's negative impact on 
the credibility and trustworthiness of the INS would erode its ability 
to obtain voluntary compliance, and that any short-term efficiency 
would be outweighed by long-term detrimental effects. Perhaps the 
greatest problem in raising a procedural due process challenge is the 
nature of the remedy. Traditionally, the remedy to a due process 
violation is to afford more process. If the court found that the sting 
had violated procedural due process, the relief to the apprehended 
aliens probably would be limited. Aliens apprehended in the sting 
and deported might argue that, at a minimum, they must be re-
turned to the United States or allowed to proceed with petitions for 
review or habeas corpus proceedings. 
Ultimately, despite winning the procedural due process challenge, 
many of the aliens who were apprehended in the sting might be de-
ported because no amount of procedural process could immunize 
them against this consequence. Succeeding in the due process chal-
lenge only ensures that the government uses fair procedures in exer-
cising its deportation power.135 A long-term consequence of 
challenging the sting on procedural due process grounds would be 
134. The San Diego INS stated that a Bag and Baggage letter had previously been 
sent to the 600 aliens who received the sting letter. See Reza, supra note I, at A23. 
Assuming that this is true and the aliens received the prior letter, the 10% response 
would be an increase in the overall rate of apprehension because these 60 people had 
previously been in the 76% who disregarded the surrender notice. 
135. Joshua Schwartz has suggested that in situations where additional due pro· 
cess will not correct the harm suffered, a court might create a form of "remedial due 
process" which would in effect estop the agency from enforcing the regulation or law 
against the person deprived of due process. See Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible 
Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an Agency's Violation of its 
Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 653, 736-42 (1992). The 
doctrine of estoppel against the government is discussed in the following section. 
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either that a court might enjoin future sting operations used to exe-
cute deportation orders, or that stings would not be used in the fu-
ture due to the INS' reluctance to face further litigation. 
Procedural due process probably is not implicated in undercover 
operations other than those used to execute deportation orders. For 
example, if the INS used an undercover operation to detect and 
commence deportation proceedings, procedural due process would 
not necessarily be at issue provided that the undercover actions did 
not eliminate any of the alien's rights to the usual deportation hear-
ing procedures. However, if the undercover operation was conducted 
in an outrageous manner, the alien might seek an exclusionary-type 
remedy such as suppression of the arrest or dismissal of the deporta-
tion proceedings. These types of challenges, however, traditionally 
have been cast as substantive due process challenges, and it is to 
substantive attacks on governmental conduct that I now turn. 
2. Substantive Due Process 
Sting operations used in non-criminal proceedings raise substan-
tive due process issues, particularly the right to be free from unrea-
sonable and unconscionable government behavior. To date, the cases 
discussing the substantive due process implications of undercover op-
erations have been confined to criminal prosecutions. To my knowl-
edge, the ability of an agency to use undercover operations in 
connection with civil enforcement efforts has not previously been ex-
plored by the courts. In administrative law, equitable estoppel has 
been used as a theoretical basis for seeking a remedy to unfair gov-
ernmental conduct. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is related to 
the constitutional due process protections in that both seek to pre-
vent overreaching or unfair behavior. This Section will begin with a 
discussion of the limited availability of successfully using estoppel 
against the government before turning to a substantive due process 
analysis. 
a. Equitable Estoppel As a Due Process Remedy 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is used to correct a harm that 
one party has caused another due to reliance on a false statement or 
misrepresentation. Although not directly styled as a substantive due 
process challenge, individuals have argued that the agency is equita-
bly estopped from enforcing its regulations due to the agency's mis-
representations or its affirmative misconduct. In the vast majority of 
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cases where an individual has claimed equitable estoppel against the 
government, the government has prevailed on a theory of govern-
ment immunity from estoppel.136 However, the Supreme Court has 
continued to suggest that there may be exceptions to the bar - in 
other words, that some forms of governmental or agency conduct 
should be subject to equitable estoppel, with the most likely excep-
tion being where the government conduct can be characterized as 
"affirmative misconduct. "137 
Aliens seeking to challenge the INS sting would most likely try to 
use this "affirmative misconduct" exception to raise a claim of equi-
table estoppel. This could be a successful theory if the court was 
convinced that the INS sting operation violated its own regulations 
and that the INS' deliberate deceit in making false promises of am-
nesty constituted affirmative misconduct.138 In a rare case granting 
equitable estoppel to an alien, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
was influenced by the agency's violation of its own regulations as 
well as the harshness of the deportation sanction.139 In the majority 
of cases in which an alien has sought estoppel, however, courts have 
not been willing to find affirmative misconduct or to grant estoppel 
on another theory.140 
136. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Office of 
Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), reh'g denied, 491 U.S. 1046 
(1990). 
137. See INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (the first case using the test of "affirm· 
ative misconduct"). Joshua Schwartz has summarized these potential exceptions as 
"cases involving proprietary activities, those alleging affirmative governmental miscon· 
duct, those not involving the federal fisc, those involving irrevocable prejudice to private 
interests or infringement of some minimum standard of decency, and cases diverging in 
some factual respect from the pattern of private estoppel claims." See Schwartz, supra 
note 135, at 665-66 (footnotes omitted). 
138. A court might prefer to review the INS conduct in the sting operation under 
a theory of equitable estoppel, for it would narrow the decision to the conduct of this 
particular sting operation and the misrepresentation made in the amnesty letter. By lim· 
iting the analysis to equitable estoppel and using the "affirmative misconduct" exception 
to government immunity, the court would not have to reach the question of whether the 
sting violated either procedural or substantive due process. 
139. See Corneil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976) (failure of State 
Department officer to follow regulations by warning alien resulted in alien taking an 
action which made her deportable). But see Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(expressly limiting Corneil-Rodriguez to its facts). See also Moser v. United States, 341 
U.S. 41 (1951) (alien was allowed to naturalize due to his reliance on erroneous govern· 
ment advice). Although the Supreme Court does not expressly use the term "equitable 
estoppel," and in fact denied relying on an estoppel theory, this case is used to exemplify 
an exception to the absolute government immunity. It is difficult to reconcile the Su-
preme Court's action in Moser with the many subsequent decisions denying aliens equi· 
table estoppel in similar situations. 
140. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Serv., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2485, 2504-05 (1993) 
(rejecting equitable estoppel as a ground for extending the legalization application period 
although the INS failed to properly define eligibility criteria in its regulations); INS v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988) (no affirmative misconduct in revoking authority of 
American Vice Consul to naturalize aliens before end of application period, thus barring 
applications by Filipino war veterans for naturalization); INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 
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The Supreme Court's threshold requirement of proving "affirma-
tive misconduct" before equitable estoppel can be granted focuses on 
the improper or excessive action of the government.141 Similarly, in 
cases challenging undercover operations, criminal defendants have 
attacked the deceit inherent in an undercover operation and have 
sought to estop the government from bringing the prosecution. These 
challenges are usually raised under the Due Process Clause as viola-
tions of the substantive right to be free from outrageous governmen-
tal conduct. Given the difficulty of successfully maintaining an 
equitable estoppel claim, aliens apprehended in undercover opera-
tions may need to employ these closely related substantive due pro-
cess challenges in criminal law. 
b. Criminal Cases Raising Substantive Due Process Challenges 
to Undercover Operations 
The cases that have considered the legitimacy and constitutional-
ity of undercover operations usually begin with the recitation from 
Sorrells v. United States142 that undercover operations are not in 
and of themselves unconstitutional because the government agents 
must use "artifice and stratagem . . . to catch those engaged in 
(1982) (18 month delay in adjudicating case, notwithstanding resulting prejudice, is not 
affirmative misconduct); Stone v. INS, 13 F.3d 934 (6th Cir.) (wrong advice from INS 
employee about deadline to file appeal is not affirmative misconduct), cert. granted, 114 
S. Ct. 2098 (1994); Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 1993) (limiting Corneil-
Rodriguez to its facts and rejecting estoppel claim); Jeziorski v. INS, 990 F.2d 1258, 
1993 WL 94714 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished disposition) (no affirmative misconduct in 
government's rejection of claim for political asylum); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 
1130 (2d Cir. 1990) (negligent conduct of INS insufficient to support estoppel); Chien-
Shih Wang v. Attorney General, 823 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1987) (INS failure to tell alien 
his application was incomplete was not a basis for estoppel even when law subsequently 
changed and alien lost right to immigrate); Taneja v. Smith, 795 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 
1986) (INS delay and carelessness insufficient to support estoppel); Mukherjee v. INS, 
793 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1986) (no estoppel of two year foreign residence requirement 
notwithstanding misrepresentation of government officer); Paul v. Smith, 784 F.2d 564 
(4th Cir. 1986) (border officer's misrepresentation insufficient to support estoppel); 
Bolourchian v. INS, 751 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1984) (INS misrepresentation about nonim-
migrant status insufficient to support estoppel); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1~76) (failure of American consul to explain the 
ability of family members to qualify for immigrant status as "following to join" under 
regulations was not sufficient misconduct for estoppel). See also Roxana C. Bacon, Es-
topping INS-'Affirmative Misconduct' Makes Positively Bad Law, 5 IMMIGR. J. 8 
(1982). 
141. See INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973). 
142. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
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criminal enterprises."143 The courts reason that in order to appre-
hend individuals engaged in crime, the government may lawfully use 
methods which are "neither appealing nor moral if judged by ab-
stract norms of decency."144 The cases cautiously but deliberately 
approve undercover actions, such as the use of paid informants, 1411 
the supplying of contraband to criminal defendants in order to gain 
confidence or establish credibility,146 and the infiltration of criminal 
organizations.14'1 With hestitation, the Ninth Circuit approved the 
INS infiltration of church organizations where the INS had evidence 
that the church members were engaged in a conspiracy to violate 
criminal immigration laws.146 The idea that the defendants partici-
pated in a crime was central to the holdings in all of these cases. 
The Supreme Court has explored the use of criminal prosecution 
mechanisms in civil prosecutions brought by the government. In 
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,149 the Supreme Court ruled 
that attorneys for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice 
could not automatically use evidence gathered by the Criminal Divi-
sion during grand jury proceedings.1150 The Court examined the his-
tory and power of the grand jury proceeding as a tool necessary to 
criminal enforcement and found that unlimited access to the evi-
dence raised three fundamental concerns. First, the disclosure of evi-
dence gathered during a grand jury proceeding would weaken the 
secrecy of those proceedings and would necessarily broaden the num-
ber of individuals who had access to the information. The Court also 
recognized that witnesses testifying at grand jury proceedings might 
fear later exposure if the testimony could be used in civil cases. Sec-
ond, prosecutors might unscrupulously manipulate grand jury pro-
ceedings to assist their colleagues in civil prosecutions. Third, the 
ability to use grand jury evidence would undermine the discovery 
and investigation limits normally imposed in civil and administrative 
proceedings. The Court concluded that access to grand jury material 
143. Id. at 441. 
144. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (1986), vacated on reh'g, cause 
remanded by United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (1986). 
145. United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied s11b nom. 
Perluss v. United States, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). 
146. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
147. United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1984). 
148. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 
(1991) (holding that the INS was permitted to infiltrate church organizations participat-
ing in the Sanctuary Movement, provided the undercover operation was made in good 
faith to detect criminal activity). Cf. Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d. 
518 (9th Cir. 1989) (vigilant review where the government conduct threatens protected 
constitutional rights such as the free exercise of religion). 
149. 463 U.S. 418 (1983). 
150. Id. at 428. 
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must be limited by judicial supervlSlon of the release of the evi-
dence, 1111 and required that the attorney seeking release of the infor-
mation provide a "strong showing of particularized need"1112 
supporting the disclosure.1113 
Following the Supreme Court's lead, one can argue that INS un-
dercover operations aimed at civil prosecutions are an improper use 
of a powerful tool and an unlawful expansion of the government's 
ability to gather evidence and conduct investigations for civil pro-
ceedings. The INS already has broad power to enforce the immigra-
tion laws. For example, border patrol agents and INS investigators 
do not need to have probable cause to question an individual about 
his status. The statute grants the power to interrogate "any alien or 
person believed to be an alien."154 In addition, the INS may conduct 
warrantless searches at the border or its functional equivalent. m But 
these specific enforcement tools do not mean that the INS may use 
any method it chooses.156 The ultimate limits on its activity are the 
notions of fundamental fairness and the Fifth Amendment right to 
due process. 
Aliens who are in the United States and who cannot establish or 
maintain lawful status usually are not classified as "criminal" 
aliens.1117 Aliens who fail to maintain lawful status or who entered 
151. Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure describes the grand 
jury secrecy and sets forth exceptions to the bar to disclosure. 
152. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 443 (adopting the test developed to determine if 
grand jury evidence could be released to a private party in Douglas Oil Co. v. Northwest 
Petrol Stops Northwest, 411 U.S. 211 (1979)). 
153. This ruling was modified in United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102 
(1987), when the majority of the Supreme Court found that Rule 6(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not prohibit the attorney who conducted the grand jury 
proceeding from consulting with a government attorney who would be bringing a civil 
complaint. 
154. See INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1988). 
155. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 287.l(a)(2) (1993) (defining the border as covering territory 
up to 100 miles away from the border). See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (applying a reasonable suspicion standard to uphold a war-
rantless search). 
156. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (race and 
alienage alone are not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that person is present in 
the country without authorization); see also Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (racially motivated stop found to be an egregious violation of alien's constitu-
tional rights). 
157. There are some classes of aliens whose presence or entry is considered to be a 
criminal act, and whose continuing presence is considered to be criminal conduct. An 
alien who reenters the United States after deportation without express permis,sion within 
the statutory prescribed period has violated 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). The statute is also 
violated by aliens who enter or attempt to enter by evading inspection through willful 
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, and are guilty of a misdemeanor. 
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the country without documentation are known in the common ver-
nacular as "illegals," but this term does not in and of itself trans-
form those people into criminals.1118 
More important than the name given to these individuals is the 
reality that deportation proceedings repeatedly have been character-
ized as "civil" in nature. The problem here is that the INS is using 
criminal enforcement techniques in civil proceedings. But although 
civil proceedings contain fewer protections, they are still subject to 
the overarching test· of fundamental fairness. If the government is 
going to use an undercover operation, a criminal law enforcement 
technique, as a part of civil enforcement of deportation laws, fairness 
dictates that a higher level of protection be afforded to those aliens 
caught in the sting. Either the INS must criminally prosecute the 
aliens who fail to appear to the Bag and Baggage Letter thus afford-
ing them more due process protections, or the Supreme Court must 
fashion .a remedy to restore fairness to the deportation proceeding. In 
other words, the adoption of criminal enforcement techniques recasts 
the deportation proceeding and renders it a hybrid proceeding 
neither purely civil nor criminal. A recognition of this hybrid status 
mandates the reevaluation of the rights at stake and the procedures 
needed to ensure fundamental fairness. In reevaluating the limits on 
criminal enforcement techniques in deportation proceedings, courts 
may want to examine the general challenges raised against under-
cover operations in criminal proceedings and the types of concerns 
expressed by the Supreme Court about the scope and conduct of un-
dercover operations. 
In United States v. Russell, 1119 the Supreme Court noted that in 
cases where the criminal defendant might not be able to prove that 
he was entrapped (a subjective standard), he might be able to chal-
lenge the government's action by arguing that it objectively violated 
due process, regardless of the defendant's character, predisposition, 
or conduct. The Supreme Court stated: 
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the con-
duct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles 
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to 
obtain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. . . . The 
law enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental 
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice," mandated by the Due 
Such violations can be prosecuted as felonies. See INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988); 
see also KESSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 37, § 5.3. 
158. Advocates of alien rights usually prefer the term "undocumented" to describe 
persons who remain in the United States without formal status. Although this language 
may seem like "politically correct" speech, the fact is that many United States citizens 
do not realize that merely being undocumented does not make a person a criminal, and 
the U.S. government is not using criminal sanctions to enforce the immigration statutes. 
159. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). 
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The challenge against government conduct is usually raised in a 
motion to dismiss the criminal indictment and is a question of law 
for the court.161 Few cases have found that government conduct 
reached the standard of fundamental unfairness outlined in Russell. 
A summary of the case law appears in the Ninth Circuit decision 
United States v. Bogart.162 The opinion notes how sparsely the doc-
trine has been used to actually dismiss criminal indictments. The 
court discusses the difficulty in developing a standard test that could 
define conduct which deviates so far from fundamental fairness as to 
be "shocking to the universal sense of justice."163 While the Ninth 
Circuit does not adopt any specific test in Bogart, the opinion does 
note that outrageous conduct is not limited only to examples of phys-
ical abuse, such as forcible pumping of the stomach, 164 but also in-
cludes those instances where the government engineers or directs the 
criminal enterprise.165 
The Ninth Circuit mentions an earlier decision, United States v. 
Valdovinos-Va/dovinos, 166 in its discussion of the case law consider-
ing due process limitations. Mr. Valdovinos-Valdovinos was charged 
with illegally transporting aliens into the United States. The San 
Francisco INS Office had used an undercover telephone line to speak 
with Mexican citizens. The INS officers who answered the phone 
pretended to be U.S. employers offering jobs if the Mexican citizens 
would enter the United States. The officers told the Mexican citizens 
that it was lawful to enter the United States without "immigration 
papers" and offered a cash reward to the person who brought the 
160. Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted). 
161. FED. R. CR111t. P. 12(b) is used to present the pretrial motion. See United 
States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983). 
162. 783 F.2d 1428, 1434 (1986), vacated on reh'g, cause remanded by United 
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 {1986). See also United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 
889, 897 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the cases rejecting motions to dismiss and stating that 
the "[g]overnment's conduct must be so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate 
the universal sense of justice"). 
163. Id. at 1435 (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 432). 
164. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (noting that actions of the 
government which shock the conscience transgress notions of fundamental fairness and 
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained, and thus will be suppressed as 
violations of the Fifth Amendment). 
165. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1436; see also United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (rejecting a motion to dismiss where the indictment found that the govern-
ment's manufacture and supply of false credit cards was not so egregious as to shock the 
universal sense of justice), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 {1988). 
166. 743 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 
(1985). 
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Mexican citizens into the United States.167 
The district court granted Mr. Valdovinos-Valdovinos' motion to 
dismiss. The court found that the INS telephone operation was out-
rageous and violated due process rights of the Mexican citizens and 
of Mr. Valdovinos-Valdovinos, who would not have been arrested but 
for the improper undercover operation.168 The district court opinion 
noted that the aliens already had been deported back to Mexico.169 
The opinion based its finding of outrageousness on the fact that the 
INS actions went beyond the infiltration of crime in their creation.170 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit recognized injuries of 
the aliens who were apprehended through this undercover operation. 
However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a criminal in-
dictment on the ground that the criminal defendant lacked standing 
to bring the due process challenge.171 There is no record of the Mexi-
can citizens challenging their arrests in deportation proceedings. 
Aliens also have tried to use a motion to dismiss against criminal 
indictments, arguing that sting operations induce defendants to com-
mit a crime or that stings were improperly used to obtain evidence. 
In a 1992 case, Ahluwalia v. United States,172 the alien defendant 
sought to use this due process defense to dismiss a criminal indict-
ment charging him with bribing the Chief Legalization Officer of the 
INS Legalization Office in Salinas, California, in order to obtain a 
Temporary Work Authorization Card (Form I-688A). Mr. 
Ahluwalia alleged that the INS sting operation constituted outra-
geous and unconscionable government behavior and that due process 
barred the government from pursuing his conviction. 
The sting began when the Chief Legalization Officer, Mr. Ward, 
was offered a single bribe. Mr. Ward contacted the FBI, which in 
turn decided it would conduct an investigation to determine if there 
was a broad conspiracy to bribe legalization officers, using Mr. Ward 
as its undercover agent. Within a few months, the sting operation 
had netted more than $1,000,000 in bribes and more than 1,000 in-
dividuals received work authorization cards in exchange for the 
money.173 
The federal magistrate who considered Mr. Ahluwalia's motion to 
167. The District Court opinion noted that there were no formal guidelines or reg· 
ulations governing the operation of the telephone line or the conduct of the INS officers 
who answered the telephone. 588 F. Supp. 551, 553 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Approximately 
one month after the decision, the Attorney General adopted undercover guidelines for the 
INS. For a discussion of the guidelines, see supra note 19. 
168. 588 F. Supp. at 553. 
169. Id. at 553 n.2. 
170. Id. at 556. 
171. 743 F.2d at 1437 (relying on United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 {1980)). 
172. 807 F. Supp. 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1992), ajfd, 30 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1994). 
173. Id. at 1493. 
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dismiss found that, under the totality of the circumstances, the gov-
ernment's conduct in the sting operation was outrageous. The magis-
trate recommended dismissal of several of the charges. Although the 
district court ultimately did not agree with the magistrate's ruling, 
the court did review the behavior of the INS and applied the factors 
developed in Abscam174 litigation to determine whether the conduct 
was sufficiently outrageous to require dismissal. 
Although many of the factors considered relate to whether the 
government induced the criminal behavior and thereby entrapped 
the defendant, other factors concern the general appropriateness of 
the government's behavior. For example, the court asked whether the 
informant or undercover agents engaged in activities, not directly re-
lated to the crime, which "violated the law or were dishonorable."175 
The court also considered whether the government agents showed "a 
proper regard for judicial and police processes."176 The court found 
that the INS and FBI did not deliberately disregard procedures, al-
though it noted that Mr. Ward sometimes failed to follow instruc-
tions or acted without his supervisor's approval. For example, he 
arbitrarily broadened or narrowed the scope of the sting or accepted 
bribes without carefully noting the source of the funds.177 
The court also considered whether the government's conduct in-
jured innocent citizens who were not the subject of the investiga-
tion.178 The court did receive evidence that some people entitled to 
temporary resident status were unable to process their applications 
because of the large numbers of people who were at the office to 
purchase false cards. Further, the crowds required the police to pa-
trol the legalization site. 
The court also considered whether the activities of the government 
agents had "any direct adverse social consequences."179 The district 
court found that "[u]nquestionably, the immigration system suffered 
174. Abscam was an undercover sting operation that resulted in the prosecution of 
a number of public officials who accepted bribes. Specifically, the court referred to 
United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). Ahluwalia, 807 F. 
Supp. at 1496-97. In affirming the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the 
Ninth Circuit specifically expressed no opinion as to the use of the factors in Myers. 30 
F.3d at 1143 n.1. For a general discussion of undercover operations and the entrapment 
defense, see Robert I. Blecker, Beyond 1984: Undercover in America-Serpico to Abscam, 
28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 823 (1983). 
175. Ahluwalia, 807 F. Supp. at 1498. 
176. Id. at 1499. 
177. Id. at 1493-94. 
178. Id. at 1499. 
179. Id. 
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some damage as a result of this operation. Some people were led to 
believe that bribery was the only way to obtain a permit to work in 
this [country]. "180 
The district court also considered how important the sting was to 
the detection of the crime in this situation.181 In a bribery case, 
courts acknowledge that undercover activities are essential because 
the crime is difficult to detect given the facts that contacts are brief 
and evidence is difficult to obtain. 
However, the district court concluded that, although the govern-
ment's investigation was sloppy, poorly supervised, and hurt the im-
migration system, the government's conduct was not sufficiently 
outrageous to off end due process.182 
In a recent opinion that was later reversed and vacated on appeal, 
an alien was able to raise a number of due process objections to INS 
conduct, and was initially successful in limiting the length of his 
criminal sentence. In United States v. Sanchez-Montoya,183 the alien 
plead guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. In his sentencing 
hearing, he sought to limit the term of his imprisonment to no more 
than two years. He argued that the INS provided him with a Form 
I-294 at the time of his deportation and it stated that the maximum 
punishment for illegal reentry was two years in prison. In reality, the 
penalty had been changed by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988184 to 
a maximum of fifteen years. The INS did not update Form I-294 to 
contain the accurate penalty until June 12, 1992, more than three 
years after the effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.18~ 
The district court ruled that the INS acted in a "grossly negli-
gent" fashion and inexcusably misinformed deportees of the conse-
quences of their unlawful reentry.186 The court further stated that, 
although the INS had no statutory obligation to warn the deportees 
of the consequences of their illegal reentry, once it assumed that ob-
ligation it had a duty to do so accurately and with reasonable 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 1500. 
182. Id. 
183. 834 F. Supp. 315 (C.D. Cal. 1993), vacated, 30 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1994). A 
number of circuit courts have rejected motions to dismiss in these same circumstances. 
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 14 F.3d 662 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Marti· 
nez-Contreras, 16 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit also rejected the due 
process argument in a motion to dismiss in United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730 
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that no authority was cited to support the claim of a denial of 
due process). 
184. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(a)·(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471. 
185. Form I-294 was apparently revised without any announcement in the Federal 
Register or review by the Office of Management and Budget, which usually is required 
for changes in such forms. This change may have violated the Administrative Procedures 
Act, which requires that the government publish changes to regulations and forms. See 5 
u.s.c. §§ 552-553 (1966). 
186. Sanchez-Montoya, 834 F. Supp. at 320. 
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care.187 The court analogized the government's conduct to the ele-
ment of· improper inducement in entrapment cases. The opinion 
noted that the motivation for refusing to convict defendants when 
the government goes too far in inducing criminal behavior is found 
in preserving " 'the institutional integrity of the system of federal 
criminal justice.' "188 Further, the court relied on a principle from 
civil law that an " 'action must be abated if its basis is violation of 
the decencies of life, disregard of the rules, statutory or common 
law, which formulate the ethics of men's relations to each other.' "189 
The district court found that the grossly negligent and continuing 
misrepresentation of the INS, and concepts of due process and en-
trapment, prevented a greater sentence than the two years stated on 
the form which the defendant received.190 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected the analysis of the district court and joined the other courts of 
appeals in rejecting both due process and equitable estoppel chal-
lenges to either the prosecution or the length of sentence.191 
c. Substantive Due Process Claims in Deportation Proceedings 
In deportation proceedings, aliens also have challenged outrageous 
government conduct through motions to suppress evidence. They 
have argued that the government's conduct was so outrageous or un-
conscionable that to allow it to introduce the challenged evidence 
would violate traditional notions of due process.192 While there is no 
bright line test of "unconscionability" or "outrageous conduct," a 
review of the successful challenges in deportation cases sheds some 
light on the limits on INS enforcement techniques. 
In the case of Navia-Duran v. /NS,193 an alien was arrested by 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 321 (quoting Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 441 (1973)). 
189. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932)). 
190. The district court opinion also noted that its decision to limit the sentence was 
permitted under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines because it promoted respect for the 
law. Id. at 323. 
191. United States v. Sanchez-Montoya, 834 F. Supp. 315 (C.D. Cal. 1993), va-
cated, 30 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 
932 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting both due process and equitable estoppel as a basis for 
limiting the sentence); United States v. Perez-Torres, 15 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 1994) (re-
jecting estoppel), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 125 (1994); United States v. Shaw, 26 F.3d 
700 (7th Cir. 1994) (criminals cannot establish reasonable reliance and therefore cannot 
assert estoppel; also, no due process violation in erroneous form). 
192. See IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE, supra note 33, § 7.2 (discussing mo-
tion to suppress). 
193. 568 F.2d 803 (!st Cir. 1977). 
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deportation officers late at night, taken to INS offices, and interro-
gated until the early morning hours. The INS failed to advise Ms. 
Navia-Duran of her right to counsel, failed to comply with their own 
arrest regulations,194 and threatened her with immediate deportation 
without explaining she had the right to a hearing. The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that all inculpatory statements made by Ms. 
Navia-Duran would be suppressed because, although the INS is not 
required to give Miranda warnings at the time of arrest, the basic 
notion of fundamental fairness would not allow a finding of de-
portability to rest solely upon a coerced statement.1911 In this case, 
the absence of warnings, the detention at the INS office, and the 
violation of the INS regulations were factors which led the court to 
find that Ms. Navia-Duran's statements were involuntary.196 
In Bong Youn Choy v. Barber,197 the involuntary statements of an 
alien were suppressed and his deportation order reversed. The INS 
interrogated the alien for more than seven hours, threatened him 
with prosecution for perjury, and told him he would be forced to 
leave the country within three weeks. The Ninth Circuit ruled that 
statements obtained by INS officers who induced fear and 
threatened the alien with prosecution were not voluntary and could 
not be used as a basis for deportation.198 
The BIA has similarly found that coercive tactics used by the INS 
violate due process. In In re Garcia,199 the BIA ruled that it was a 
denial of due process when the INS failed to inform the alien of his 
right to counsel, told him he had no rights, claimed his deportation 
was inevitable, and detained the alien without explanation. In this 
situation, statements by the alien were ruled involuntary and there-
fore could not form the basis of a finding of deportability.200 In In re 
Toro,201 the BIA ruled that evidence would be excluded if the cir-
cumstances surrounding the arrest and interrogation would render 
use of the evidence "fundamentally unfair" and violative of due pro-
cess.202 More recently, the BIA found that it was a denial of due 
194. Id. at 809 n.6. Note that 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1993) requires that an alien 
arrested without a warrant be advised of the reason for the arrest, her right to counsel, 
and that any statement made may be used against her in a subsequent proceeding. 
195. 568 F.2d at 808. 
196. Id. at 809. 
197. 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960). 
198. Id. at 647. See also Ali v. INS, 661 F. Supp 1234 (D. Mass. 1986) (sup-
pressing statements where the INS threatened the spouse of an alien, a U.S. citizen, with 
criminal prosecution, and told her to ignore her attorney). But cf. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 
263 U.S. 149 (1923) (stating in dicta that involuntary statements could be used in depor-
tation proceedings). 
199. 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 1980). 
200. Id. at 321. 
201. 17 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA 1980). 
202. Id. at 343; see also In re Ramira-Cordova, No .. A21-095-659 (BIA 1980) 
(suppression when evidence was gained after a nighttime warrantless entry into alien's 
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process for the INS to use statements gained in an interview with an 
unaccompanied eleven-year-old child.203 
In Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS,204 the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA 
and upheld the immigration judge's grant of a motion to suppress. 
Mr. Gonzalez was riding in a car with his father on a highway north 
of San Diego. The Border Patrol stopped the car and asked Mr. 
Gonzalez to provide documentation of his right to legally reside in 
the United States. Mr. Gonzalez challenged the Border Patrol stop, 
alleging that he had been stopped solely because of his Hispanic ap-
pearance and that a racially-based stop constituted an egregious vio-
lation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The immigration judge 
granted the motion to suppress. The BIA reversed, claiming that this 
type of stop was not an egregious violation of the law regarding 
Fourth Amendment stops, which necessitated the use of the exclu-
sionary rule under the holding of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.205 
In upholding the motion to suppress, the Ninth Circuit discussed 
the "egregious violation" exception to the exclusionary rule bar of 
Lopez-Mendoza, and stated that the exception was not limited to 
situations involving physical brutality (such as the force used in 
Rochin). Rather, an egregious violation could be established where 
the INS acted in deliberate violation " 'of the Fourth Amendment, 
or by conduct a reasonable officer should know is in violation of the 
Constitution.' "206 The Ninth Circuit gave three main reasons why it 
residence). 
203. In re Hernandez-Jimenez, No. A29-988-097, slip op. at 6 (BIA 1991) (un-
published decision) (discussed with approval in Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d I, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1994)). • 
204. 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). 
205. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing when the exclusionary rule should be applied). The BIA also found that Mr. 
Gonzalez had failed to state a prima facie case in his motion to suppress because he did 
not clearly state how he was injured by the illegal stop. The Ninth Circuit held that the 
INS had waived this objection to the motion to suppress because the INS attorney did 
not object at the introduction of the motion. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1444. 
206. Id. at 1448-49 (emphasis added) (quoting Adamson v. Commissioner, 745 
F.2d 541, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1984)). In a partial dissent, Judge Choy disagreed with the 
majority, holding that violations of constitutional rights which occurred during "peaceful 
arrests" need not result in exclusion of evidence in civil deportation proceedings. 22 F.3d 
at 1454 (emphasis in original). Judge Choy commented that: 
Absent resort to reliable but shocking methods of obtaining evidence repre-
sented by the emetic solution administered in Rochin, this [holding of Lopez-
M endoza] suggests that the exclusionary rule will not apply to civil deportation 
hearings where the INS refrains from unpeaceable (but not necessarily brutal) 
tactics which commonly undermine both fundamental fairness and the proba-
tive value of the evidence seized thereby. 
Id. (relying in part on Cervantes-Cuevas v. INS, 797 F.2d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 1985) 
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ruled that the racially based stop was made in bad faith and thus 
constituted an egregious violation. First, the violation was egregious 
because racial discrimination is one of the most "serious threats to 
our notion of fundamental fairness. "207 Second, it was egregious be-
cause the INS officers had completed extensive training regarding 
prior court decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment, and be-
cause of the adoption of official INS policies prohibiting racially 
based stops. Thus, INS officers should have known that a racially 
motivated stop was a violation of the Constitution. Finally, by apply-
ing an objective standard to evaluate the actions of the INS officer, 
the Ninth Circuit avoided allowing an egregious violation to occur 
simply because the INS officer was not subjectively aware of his or 
her unconscious racism. 208 
Based on the factors outlined in these cases concerning substantive 
due process, challengers of the underlying constitutionality of the 
San Diego sting could mount a substantive due process attack on 
several grounds. These grounds could be presented in a motion to 
suppress or in a claim for injunctive relief as part of a writ of habeas 
corpus.209 
First, the sting was outrageous because it used government sta-
tionery to falsely offer a benefit that aliens reasonably could have 
believed the INS had the power to offer. One of the factors used to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the undercover operation is whether 
the dishonorable action impinges on the integrity of the federal sys-
tem of justice. It did so here. 
Second, the INS sting did not target criminal behavior, but was 
used solely to execute a civil deportation order. The use of a criminal 
law enforcement tactic is excessive, especially in light of the fact 
that the INS had the specific addresses of the aliens involved and 
could have arrested them following normal procedures. The criminal 
law cases that have upheld undercover operations noted the govern-
ment's particular need to be able to ferret out criminal behavior or 
(allowing the admission of statements made by an alien following an unlawful detention 
absent evidence which cast doubt on the probative value of the voluntary statements)). 
Judge Choy recommended that civil injunctions of egregious INS conduct would be a 
better method of deterring such behavior. Id. 
207. Id. at 1449. 
208. Id. 
209. Rosenbaum, supra note 31, at n.42. See also text accompanying note 31 for a 
discussion of using civil rights statutes to enjoin INS misconduct. In an interesting use of 
injunctive relief, attorneys successfully enjoined the U.S. government from removing a 
citizen of the People's Republic of China who was brought to testify in a criminal trial. 
See Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The Northern 
District Court in California found that the U.S. Attorney had acted outrageously and in 
violation of due process in not investigating facts, such as contradictions in testimony, 
which suggested that the Chinese interrogators had tortured the witness. Id. at 1551-53. 
Mr. Wang also simultaneously pursued a claim for political asylum. 
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to gather evidence which would otherwise be undetectable, such as 
evidence in bribery cases. 
Although the civil proceeding characterization traditionally has 
been used to justify fewer due process protections, the ultimate stan-
dard of "fundamental fairness" would require a court to consider 
whether the sting and the subsequent deportations would be an ex-
cessive exercise of the government's power to enforce civil violations. 
In a sense, by using an undercover operation, a criminal law enforce-
ment technique, the INS is trying to have its cake and eat it, too. 
The INS wants to have deportation classified as a civil proceeding, 
but does not want to limit its own conduct to the traditional realms 
of civil law enforcment, or to use the criminal laws available in this 
situation.210 Given that deportation results in the end of further ad-
ministrative or judicial review in addition to many other harsh conse-
quences, a court may find that the removal of an alien following an 
undercover operation was a denial of due process. Moreover, the use 
of undercover operations to enforce deportation orders may have vio-
lated due process by going beyond the scope of the agency's author-
ity or by violating its own internal guidelines.211 
Third, the INS did not comply with its own regulations in failing 
to contact attorneys of record, and interfered with statutory rights to 
counsel. 212 
Fourth, the San Diego sting had direct and adverse social conse-
quences because it greatly decreased the public's ability to trust the 
federal government and, in particular, the INS. If the government 
desires to have voluntary compliance through government letters and 
summons, the citizen or alien involved must not believe that the 
summons is actually a ruse for some unforeseen punishment. 
Fifth, an INS sting operation, although not in all cases expressly 
violating any INS regulation, does impinge on the due process rights 
of aliens. Failure to notify the aliens' counsel violated INS regula-
tions and impermissibly interfered with the right to counsel. Aliens 
who were apprehended in this sting should have been held for sev-
enty-two hours before removal or should have been informed of the 
many rights they were relinquishing. The coercive nature of the sting 
210. Some aliens can be prosecuted for failure to appear after a Bag and Baggage 
Letter. See INA § 242(e), 8 U.S.C. 1252(e) (1988). 
211. The INS Guidelines for undercover operations require approval of sting oper-
ations by INS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. See supra note 19 and discussion in 
Section Ill, supra. 
212. See GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 12, § 72.04[12][d] (discussing the 
statutory right to counsel). 
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itself would preclude the characterization of any waiver of rights as 
"knowing and voluntary." 
In summary, it is my contention based on all of these factors that 
the sting was unconscionable and violated traditional norms of 
fairness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress should act to protect the rights of aliens and safeguard 
the right to judicial review. Statutory change would guide the INS 
toward executing final orders of deportation in a lawful manner with 
scrupulous regard for the due process rights of aliens. At a mini-
mum, the seventy-two-hour hold before execution of a deportation 
order should be required by statute. Further, any waiver of that 
right should have to be documented by a written recitation213 of the 
many rights that the aliens would be foregoing. This recitation 
should include an acknowledgement of all rights forgone, including 
the alien's right to counsel, to appeal, to file a motion for reconsider-
ation, to file a motion to reopen an administrative decision, and to 
seek discretionary stays of deportation. 
More broadly, Congress should clearly limit INS undercover oper-
ations to the enforcement of criminal laws. The failure to separate 
the criminal enforcement, deportation, and benefit-provider roles of 
the INS from its civil enforcement role continues to breed abuse of 
basic due process rights, and diminishes -the credibility of the agency 
in seeking voluntary compliance with its orders. 
The INS also should act to protect the rights of aliens. Although 
Commissioner Meissner may have intended to establish procedures 
that control the use of undercover operations in order to avoid a re-
peat of the San Diego sting, the new procedures do not sufficiently 
protect the rights of aliens or the general public from overzealous 
undercover operations. The procedures must be amended to clarify a 
number of points: 
First, an amendment to the procedures should clearly limit under-
cover operations to the enforcement of criminal violations within the 
jurisdiction of the INS, and should not allow their use for regulatory 
or statutory violations. The INS and its officers are not fully trained 
in law enforcement procedures and may violate constitutional and 
civil rights in the undercover efforts. 
213. Congress recently made a similar recitation of rights mandatory in its 
changes to the Order to Show Cause (OSC) recitations. The regulations implementing 
the new changes to the OSC became effective June 13, 1992, 57 Fed. Reg. 11,568 (April 
6, 1992). For the legislative history, see INA§ 242B, 8 U.S.C. § 1252B (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993) (added in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 
Stat. 5061) (amended by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(g)(6), 105 Stat. 1753). 
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Second, the procedures should more clearly delineate the duty of 
the INS to comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines. The re-
porting requirements of those Guidelines go much further in requir-
ing the INS to demonstrate that other possible methods have failed 
and that the undercover operation is nevertheless justified. The INS 
procedures should repeat and require the post-operation report, com-
plying with the Guidelines, and the post-operation report must be 
sent to the office of the Attorney General. 
Finally, I join other commentators in strongly recommending that 
the INS consider adopting a civilian oversight committee to review 
the post-operation reports and to make recommendations about the 
conduct and continuance of any undercover operation. Perhaps the 
Citizens' Advisory Panel newly created in February 1994 could ex-
amine the INS' use of undercover operations.214 Establishing and 
maintaining the trust of the community was one of Commissioner 
Meissner's stated goals in adopting the new procedures. Only by al-
lowing external review of INS conduct will the agency be able to 
develop a measure of credibility and trust. 
214. See 59 Fed. Reg. 6658 (1994). 
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